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ABSTRACT 
U.S-IRANIAN RELATIONS ON THE ROAD TO THE ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTION 
                                    UZAKGİDER, GÜLŞAH 
                                  M.A. in International Relations 
                             Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
                                                  July 2010 
This thesis aims to elaborate on the U.S.-Iranian relations on the road to the 
Islamic revolution with a special attention to the identity-security dynamics in 
these relations and in the impact on the dynamics of the foreign policies of the 
two countries. In addition, the societal security concerns are discussed in 
comparison to the threat perceptions of the Iranian state. It attempts to find an 
answer to the question how the U.S.-Iranian relations affected the internal and 
external dynamics that Iran found itself on the eve of the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. 
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ÖZET 
İSLAM DEVRİMİ YOLUNDA ABD-İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ 
                                        UZAKGİDER, GÜLŞAH 
                                 Yükseklisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler  
            Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
                                                 Temmuz 2010 
Bu tez, İslam Devrimi öncesi ABD-İran ilişkilerini, kimlik-güvenlik 
dinamiklerine vurgu yaparak, bu dinamiklerin iki ülke arasındaki dış ilişkilere 
etkilerini incelemektedir. Buna ek olarak, Iran devletinin tehdit algılamalarına 
karşılık İran toplumunun güvenlik endişelerini tartışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, 
ABD-İran ilişkilerinin, İran’ın 1979 İslam Devrimi öncesi iç ve dış 
dinamiklerini nasıl etkilediği sorusu da yanıtlanmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, devrim, güvenlik, İran, 
kimlik, toplum  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Given its strategic position in the Middle East, Iran was at the core of great 
power interests, i.e. Britain, Russia and then the United States. For Britain, Iran was, 
first of all, a key area on the route to India, whereas Russia historically saw Iran as a 
part of its expansionist policy. Thus, it was long before the First World War that Iran 
became a battlefield for Anglo-Russian rivalry.  
 During the reign of the Qajar dynasty, which had become weak and corrupt 
towards its last years, both powers coerced Iran to give concessions. The great power 
rivalry in the region gained another dimension after the discovery of oil in Iran, in 
1901. The first oil concession given to a British company constituted the beginning 
of a particular policy that Iran conducted until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later named Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), was 
founded to operate on the Iranian oil fields. The majority of the shares of the AIOC 
belonged to Britain and London was in full control of the company including its 
taxes. Iranians were only workers in the company and the AIOC paid very little tax 
or duty to the Iranian state. Faced with such a concession, Russia also insisted on 
similar privileges in order not to lag behind Britain in Iran, for the two rivals did not 
want to allow each other to obtain superiority in Iran. 
 2 
 The First World War had considerably negative impacts on Iran. During the 
war, British forces were in occupation of most of the Middle East and it made a deal 
with Russia on the partition of Iran. Accordingly, Russia invaded the northern part of 
the country, whereas Britain was in control of the south. Despite the fact that the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 interrupted the Russian influence in Iran, it soon 
returned to the field with additional purposes, i.e. to expand its ideology.  
 In the interwar period, Iran was suffering from the post-war conditions both 
economically and politically. Discontentment with the Qajar dynasty was expanding 
among the people and finally in 1921, a Cossack Brigade commander, Reza Khan 
and a pro-British politician, Sayyed Zia Tabatabai, took the control by overthrowing 
the Prime Minister and the Shah. By 1926, Reza Khan acceded to the throne and 
inaugurated a new dynasty in Iran, the Pahlavis. Under his rule, Iran went through 
rigorous social and economic reforms, aiming to centralize the government, create a 
well-disciplined army and provide industrialization. Although Reza Shah aimed at 
the independence of Iran through a nationalistic policy, the external powers‟ 
influence in Iran continued. Looking for a third power to counterbalance Anglo-
Soviet influence, Reza Shah decided to get closer with Germany, which disturbed the 
Allies.  
 When the Second World War broke out, Iran decided to remain neutral, 
which the Allies again did not appreciate. When the close relations of the Shah with 
Adolf Hitler became obvious, Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran and sent 
Reza Shah to exile, giving the throne to his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1941. 
The new shah followed his father‟s policies and he prioritized the independence of 
Iran through modernization and reform programs. So as to counterbalance the British 
and Soviet influence, the Shah encouraged the United States to get involved more in 
 3 
Iranian affairs. Until the Anglo-Soviet invasion, the United States was not overtly 
interested in Iran. Nonetheless, the rivalry between London and Moscow and oil‟s 
taking place of coal and its increasing importance made the United States get 
involved in Iran. Through diplomatic means, it persuaded the invading powers to 
withdraw from the Iranian territories after the war. As it promised, Britain withdrew 
its forces when the war ended, whereas the Soviets needed to be persuaded by the 
Americans, UN, as well as Tehran‟s skillful diplomacy.  
 The vacuum left by the withdrawal of the British was filled by the United 
States. American presidents beginning from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter 
had developed good relations with the Shah. As the discourses of the presidents until 
the hostage crisis of 1979 suggested, Iran and the United States defined themselves 
and defined each other. They shared the same principles and they had the same goal 
as regards to world politics. The presence of the United States was regarded as a 
guarantee of independence by Iranian decision makers. However, this view was not 
shared by the Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who was elected in 1951. 
Mossadegh, a nationalist politician in the parliament opted for the nationalization of 
Iranian oil and gained considerable support for his policies. Yet, the Shah did not 
agree with him on most issues. After the nationalization of oil, trade and economics 
of Iran was highly affected as well as the economies of the Western countries. 
Hence, collaborating with the CIA and the MI6, the Shah wanted the Prime Minister 
to be overthrown. As a result of the Operation Ajax, Dr. Mossadegh was arrested in 
1953 and the incident constituted the first direct intervention of the United States in 
Iranian affairs.  
 After the 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shah changed his policies in order to 
gain power domestically, believing that it was the only road to gaining power in the 
 4 
international realm. After establishing a secret police service, SAVAK, he 
consolidated his power with repressive political measures and socio-economic 
policies. The White Revolution, aiming at improvements on social, economic and 
political fields, brought land reform that developed agricultural activities, educational 
reforms that increased the literacy rate and educational level and health reforms that 
augmented the number of hospitals. However, the reforms did not suffice for full 
development. Furthermore, they did not service all parts of the society, which caused 
a societal insecurity among the Iranians. Another factor that created societal 
insecurity was the political reforms that gave rights to women, which the clergy did 
not appreciate. Finally, the external intervention constituted a source of insecurity 
perceived by the Iranian society against their identity, independence and rights.  
 The opposition groups united under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
who had been sent to exile by the Shah. Khomeini accused the Shah of being the 
puppet of the United States and denounced his policies as against Islamic rules.  
 One of the turning points of U.S.-Iranian relations was the hostage crisis 
between November 4, 1979 and January 20, 1981. The incident began as a kind of 
protest and then turned into an important attack, as a result of which sixty-six 
Americans were taken hostage by the Iranian university students. Soon after it was 
heard, hostage taking became almost a symbol of Iranian independence and many 
Iranians believed that Iranian people showed that they were capable of defeating the 
United State. As there was a transitional government in Iran, the United States did 
not have any respondent and it faced an unusual situation, unlike its normal way of 
diplomatic relations. The Shah had left the country and flew to Egypt. In the 
meantime, Khomeini returned to Iran and took up control of the government with the 
Revolutionary Council.  
 5 
 Beginning from the hostage crisis, the discourses of the United States and 
Iran changed radically and they began to define their self-identity and the Other as 
opposed to each other. The United States represented Iran as an “irresponsible 
militant”, while Iran accused the United States of being the “Great Satan” and 
“interventionist”. The foreign policies of the two countries were shaped in line with 
their discourses and came to the point of breakdown after the revolution. 
 Having come as an unexpected revolution, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
has been studied by many scholars of International Relations. This study contributes 
to the literature by approaching the relations from the perspective of post-
structuralism and it examines the identity-security dynamics in US-Iranian relations. 
Moreover, an insight through the societal security perspective is presented. To this 
end, Chapter II provides a brief overview on the Cold War dynamics as this period of 
history had its special conjuncture, also framing the U.S.-Iranian relations. In 
Chapter III, U.S.-Iranian relations are discussed from a historical perspective and the 
key moments in the history of the relations are presented. Chapter IV provides a 
theoretical approach in order to examine the security-identity dynamics in the U.S.-
Iranian relations and their mutual construction of self-identity and the “Other” is 
pointed out. In this part, a preliminary discourse analysis is provided to examine 
identity constructions and representations of Iran and the United States during three 
eras, i.e. the Shah era, the hostage crisis and the Khomeini era, building on Hansen‟s 
work.
1
 It is concluded that the United States and Iran constructed their 
representations of “Self” and “Other” as opposed to each other as well as their 
foreign policies. Finally, in Chapter V, the societal security theory is presented and 
domestic politics and foreign relations of Iran are explained in this framework. 
                                                 
1
 L. Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War New International 
Relations, (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
 6 
 In conclusion, within the provided framework, it will be argued that the U.S.-
Iranian relations on the road to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 might have had an 
impact on the internal dynamics of Iran, as these dynamics effected Iran‟s foreign 
relations.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE COLD WAR DYNAMICS 
 
 
This section of the study aims to provide an overview on the Cold War 
period, which constitutes an unprecedented period and context in world politics. 
Relations between the two superpowers drew a bigger picture of both their relations 
with other states and the relations between other states. Hence, having an 
understanding of it will doubtlessly provide a platform on which the analysis of the 
U.S.-Iranian relations will be discussed.  
 
2.1. The Origins of the Cold War 
The literature on the Cold War history varies as regards their approaches and 
methods of interpretation of the historical events and foreign policies of the states 
involved.
2
 This section of the study will focus on the early interactions between the 
                                                 
2
 As Chasman and Gilbert point out, until the 1960s, most Americans assumed that it was the Soviet 
Union and the traditional Russian foreign policy that caused the Cold War. However, the new, 
revisionist interpretations of history put another dimension to the understanding of the Cold War 
history. Some authors, such as Williams  and Kolko referred to the American economic system and 
government system as a root cause of the Cold War. Some other authors, e.g. Gaddis, May, sought the 
origins of the Cold War in the personalities of leaders or at the bureaucratic level. G. Cashman, A. 
Gilbert, “Some Analytical Approaches to the Cold War Debate”, The History Teacher, Vol.10, No.2, 
(1977), 263-280.  Also, by referring to the article of John Lewis Gaddis (J.L.Gaddis, “The Emerging 
Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History (1983), vii.) 
Dunnabin stated that commentators on the Cold War are categorized into three as “orthodox”, 
“revisionist” and post-revisionist”. Accordingly, the orthodox traditionalists regard the expansionist 
policies of the Soviet Union as the cause of the Cold War, while the revisionists contented that it was 
 8 
United States and the Soviet Union and the evolution of their relations in line with 
the changing conjuncture, modified foreign policies and also various technological 
improvements, which will be beneficial for my purposes and the scope of this 
chapter. 
The interaction between the United States and Tsarist Russia often remained 
at the lowest level for a long period of time, from the beginning of the 19
th
 century to 
the end. They were distinct countries that did not constitute a threat to each others‟ 
interests. This distinctness was not only a result of their geographic positions and 
their cultural differences but also due to the lack of technological improvements. 
Parallel with the progress in transportation and communication fields, the interaction 
between these two states began to augment, particularly along with their new projects 
of amelioration of their navy and railroad. The U.S. was modernizing its navy while 
Russia was building the Trans-Siberian railway, both aiming to project influence 
towards Northeast Asia.
3
 Thus, the policy roads of the two rivals of the Cold War 
intersected at the end of the 19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
, when the two 
states turned their attention to the same part of the world to project their influence. 
Another moment of clash of interest between the U.S. and Russia that was put 
forward by Gaddis was the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, during which the 
United States aligned itself alongside Britain and supported Japan.
4
 Therefore, the 
Russo-Japanese War became the first “inimical” interaction between the U.S. and 
Russia as they virtually became the two sides of the war.  
                                                                                                                                          
the United States which was expansionist and the post-revisionist see the Cold War as a result of the 
international system, namely the power dynamics between two powers in Europe. J.D.P. Dunnabin, 
The Cold War, (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008), 5-7. 
3
 J.L Gaddis, We Now Know,  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3. 
4
 Gaddis, 3. 
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 On the other hand, Gaddis argued that the reason why the U.S.-Russian 
relations were friendly was the infrequency of their interactions.
5
 He argued that in 
spite of the fact that the interaction between the two states was not as frequent as 
during the Cold War, there were potential areas of conflict such as the challenge that 
the first parliamentary revolution posed to monarchism, the fishing areas in the 
Pacific Northwest or the possibility of Russian support for the European colonization 
in Latin America. And he questioned the reason why these potential conflict sources 
did not affect the relation between the United States and Russia. The principal 
answer that he provided to the question is “the mutual willingness to tolerate the 
coexistence of states with differing social systems.”6 According to Gaddis, at the 
time foreign policy was about pursuing the state‟s own interests, not changing the 
systems of the others. Besides, the awareness of Russia of the balance of power 
system and the sensitiveness of Europe prevented Russia from taking steps that 
would trigger conflict in its relations with the United States.  
 In addition to the systemic conjuncture conditions, technological 
improvements facilitated emigration between the United States and Russia
7
, which 
contributed to the knowledge about each other and provided them with more 
awareness of their systems and governance. That is, the United States became aware 
of the repressive policies and activities of the tsarist government. Getting to know 
Russia more closely at a time when the number of democratic institutions was 
increasing, the American public opinion began questioning how a democracy could 
have normal relations with such a repressive government.
 8
  
                                                 
5
 J. L Gaddis, The Long Peace, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 4. 
6
 Gaddis, 3.  
7
 Although the emigrations were mainly from Russia to the United States, there was a small number of 
people who emigrated to Russia from the U.S. See Gaddis (1998). 
8
 Gaddis (1998). 
 10 
 Although the United States and Russia took the same side during the First 
World War, after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, their relation gained another 
dimension, i.e. ideology. After the Russian Revolution in March, President Wilson 
began to perceive Russia as a potential democracy.
9
 Thus, the West was content that 
the tsar had abdicated and a representative government was established.
10
 However, 
with the return of Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov, namely Lenin, in April 1917 and 
Bolshevik‟s seizure of power, the United States found itself in a different position.  
While Wilson declared war in favor of democracy, Lenin denounced it as the 
inevitable result of capitalism. Thus, after the war and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to spread their own ideologies. 
The United States adopted a policy based on self-determination, open markets and 
collective security principles as reflected in the Wilson principles, while the Soviet 
Union aimed to effuse the ideas of the revolution and denied the Wilsonian ideas 
categorically. Hence, the post-war projects of both states involved ideological 
frameworks and the confrontation between the two states was carried to the 
ideological platform, which made two universalist ideologies, Wilson‟s ideology and 
Lenin‟s ideology, affront each other.11  
 
 2.2. Post-World War II Atmosphere and the Cold War 
The Second World War added another aspect to the foreign policies of the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union and to the relations between them. Just before the Second 
World War the two countries began to develop a formal relation after the U.S. 
recognition of the Soviet Union on October 10, 1933 with an agreement signed by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov. Despite the 
                                                 
9
 P. G. Boyle, American-Soviet Relations, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 2. 
10
 A. Cassel, Ideology and International Relations in the World, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 133. 
11
 Gaddis (1998), 5. 
 11 
fact that Japan and Germany‟s positions were not posing a threat to either country at 
that time, the sense of security that was decreasing with Hitler‟s coming to power in 
Germany and Japan‟s military preparation to conquer China urged the United States 
and the Soviet Union to leave their isolationist positions.
12
 Nevertheless, as Powaski 
puts forth, as both sides were expecting different things from launching of diplomatic 
relations, they soon became disillusioned.
13
 For as much as the United States was not 
eager to go to war against Japan and Roosevelt was reassuring the American people 
that the United States would remain at peace, while the Soviet Union was expecting a 
material support against Japan and finally discovered that the support from the 
United States could only be a moral support. 
14
 Thus, it may be fair to state that the 
United States and the Soviet Union took a step to approach each other after realizing 
that they needed each other, in spite of the fact that they expected different things 
from each other. The Soviet Union expected the United States to support it at the 
face of Japanese ambitions, while the United States sought to get out of its 
isolationist position as Germany was recovering from its defeat conditions and Japan 
was developing ambitious preparations against China.  
 By 1937, the sides of the Second World War began to be apparent. In 
Germany, Hitler violated international agreements by sending troops to the 
demilitarized Rhineland and by increasing the number of troops in the German army. 
Italy was demonstrating the signs of an aggressive policy under Mussolini and the 
lines of the new war was marked by the Axis Pact signed by the two dictators, who 
highly supported the another dictator-to-be, general Franco in the Spanish Civil War 
as opposed to the Soviet Union inadequately backing up the republicans. On the 
other hand, Japan was rising as an aggressor in the Far East, attacking the Soviet 
                                                 
12
 R.E. Powaski, The Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 35. 
13
 Powaski, 37. 
14
 Powaski, 37. 
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forces and a U.S. gunboat.
15
 According to Powaski, the debt issue between the 
United States and the Soviet Union prevented them to fully cooperate as bargaining 
between them proved to be fruitless.  
 In the face of Axis aggression, the inability of the Western Allies and the 
Soviet Union paved the way for the Soviet- German non-aggression pact in 1940, 
which enabled Germany to attack Poland and help Stalin “to put more territory 
between Germany and the Soviet Heartland”16 and which created a reaction in the 
United States. Nonetheless, the Axis aggression convinced the American public 
opinion that the United States might give support to the Allies, which enabled 
Roosevelt to pursue his policy to get close with the Soviet Union to keep it in the war 
against Germany once Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 by offering aid.
17
 
Hence, the mutual understanding that the two states needed each other during the war 
and the mutual threat perceptions and concerns resulted in their taking the same side 
in the war despite the pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany, which 
was actually derived from the disquiet about the German aggression rather than a 
closeness to Germany. 
 Towards the end of the war, the post-war security was put on the agenda of 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. Leffler states that the steps taken by the 
U.S. demonstrates to which extent Washington was concerned about its post-war 
security, particularly after the Pearl Harbor experience the U.S. felt the need to 
develop an overseas base system for defense in depth and for projecting power 
against a potential adversary. Additionally, the belief that the U.S. could not allow 
any adversary to control Europe affected the post-war decisions of the United 
                                                 
15
 Powaski, 40. 
16
 Powaski, 45. 
17
 Powaski, 48. 
 13 
States.
18
 In this respect, the obvious rise of the Soviet power was seen as a potential 
threat despite the alliance in the war. By the end of the war, the American officials 
were worried about the possible Soviet control over Eastern Europe, which would 
strengthen the Soviet Union both economically and militarily.
19
 In spite of the fact 
that it was recognized that the Soviet Union was not willing to go to war again just 
after the Second World War, its efforts to spread communism through Europe and 
their results in France and Czechoslovakia created a concern among the U.S. officials 
as they were assessing the post-war plight in the region and the fragility of the 
situation.
20
 Accordingly, in mid-1947, it was concluded by the CIA that “the greatest 
danger to the security of the United States is the possibility of economic collapse in 
Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Communist elements”21 
 On the other hand, showing the other side of the coin, MccGwire analyzes the 
Soviet perceptions of threat and its assessment of defense requirements by stating 
that purely ideology or the Second World War experiences cannot fully explain the 
Soviet concerns at that time.
22
 According to MccGwire, the most important factor 
that shaped the Soviet foreign policy and threat perception was its experience 
through history and its grievances inherited from its defeats as a result of its 
underdevelopment. Thus, Russia could not “lag behind” again as Stalin said in 1931. 
In the face of the United States, which had the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union was 
lagging behind in terms of technology and science despite its growing military 
capacity during the war years. Hence, the policies of the Soviet Union was a blend of 
realpolitik and ideology, in the sense that it needed neighbors that were friendly to 
                                                 
18
 M. Leffler, “National Secuirty and US Foreign Policy”, in M. Leffler, D.S Painter, eds., Origins Of 
The Cold War, (London: Routledge, 1994), 18-23. 
19
 Leffler, 24. 
20
 Leffler, 28. 
21
 Leffler, 29. 
22
 M. MccGwire, “National Secuirty and Soviet Foreign Policy”, in M. Leffler, D.S. Painter, eds., 
Origins Of The Cold War, (London: Routledge, 1994), 54. 
 14 
itself, i.e. with communist governments, and it did not want to lag behind in the 
rivalry between capitalism and communism in terms of technology, politics and 
economics.
23
   
 
 2.3. The Atomic Bomb and Nuclear Deterrence 
It was the atomic bomb, which was dropped on Nagasaki on October 9, 1945 
that put an end to the Second World War and it was quite obvious that it would shape 
the post-war conditions and conjuncture. Sherwin, by attracting attention to the 
questions about the atomic bomb debate, demonstrates that there is no consensus 
among the researches.
24
 Accordingly, the debate between those who argue that the 
United States could have ended the war without using atomic bombs and that it used 
the bomb because it wanted to impress the Soviet Union and traditionalists who 
contend that the United States could not know if Japan would surrender. Either way, 
the nuclear power and the atomic bomb constituted the core foreign policy issue and 
principal factor that shaped the relations between the two superpowers after World 
War II.  
 Sherwin continues his arguments by pointing out that once the United States 
had the atomic bomb, it did not know how to use it effectively. It was obvious that it 
would give the U.S. a kind of superiority against the Soviet Union in the post-war 
conditions. In this context, it cooperated with Britain in order to have an Anglo-
American monopoly in the field.
25
 Similarly, Sherwin questions Roosevelt‟s policy 
at that time and emphasizes the dilemma in the policy choice of the President. 
Accordingly, Roosevelt chose not to inform the Soviet Union about the intentions of 
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the United States about the atomic bomb, which paved the way for an arms race. 
However, if he had sought for cooperation on the issue, he could not have achieved 
his objective, that is utilizing the atomic bomb for diplomatic efficiency. In that 
sense, both choices had risks.
26
 When Truman assumed the presidency, he also 
inherited the atomic bomb policies of Roosevelt, which resulted in two atomic 
attacks on Japan and their persuasion to end the war. 
 The Soviet Union did not wait long to launch its own nuclear program, which, 
according to Holloway, was not obvious to the United States and it made its atomic 
bomb test on August 1949.
27
 Holloway points out the relation between the nuclear 
weapon developments of the two states and argues that they stimulated each other.
28
 
However, what was obvious was that nuclear weapons were unique in the sense that 
they had absolute destruction capacity and that they cannot be used just like the other 
military weapons.
29
 Although atomic bombs were thought to be effective in post-war 
relations with the Soviet Union by helping deterring it from expansion in the East 
Europe, the Soviet response to the U.S. nuclear development changed the thinking 
from “compelling” to “deterring”.30 In parallel with this shift, the MAD (Mutually 
Assured Destruction) doctrine emerged so as to explain the situation in which the 
United States and the Soviet Union found themselves. Neither side could gain in the 
case of an attack. Also their deterrence capabilities prevented a possible attack.
31
 
Nonetheless, the MAD rendered the arms race meaningless and it was not certain 
that the Soviet Union would take the threat seriously. Thus, a new, supplemental 
doctrine replaced the MAD in order to reinforce the deterrent capacity of the armed 
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forces: Nuclear Use Theories (NUT‟s) and Flexible Response.32 The uncertainty 
marked with doctrines and the question whether a war would be possible or not was 
the foundation of deterrence. According to Tunander, deterrence has paradoxes in 
itself, in that it takes a nuclear war both possible and impossible and that it sees the 
system suitable for a war while this fact risks bring about the war.
33
  
 Hence, the nuclear attacks on Japan that put an end to the Second World War 
brought about another war, in which no hot conflict was experienced. In spite of the 
fact that the debates about the question whether the atomic bomb attacks on Japan 
were used with the intention to end the war or impress the Soviet Union, it is a well-
known fact that it caused an arms race between two superpowers. Nevertheless, the 
unusual destructive effect of the nuclear bomb prevented the two sides to attack each 
other, which actually constituted the logic of deterrence, even if it has paradoxes in 
itself, as neither side could gain anything from a possible nuclear attack.  
 
2.4. Ideology and Spheres of Influence 
The rivalry between two superpowers was not solely on military and nuclear 
dimensions. One of the most important aspects of this rivalry was based on ideology. 
As it is mentioned before, after the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
two opposing ideologies faced each other, that is, Wilsonian ideology and Leninist 
ideology, i.e. capitalism vs. communism. Both ideologies claimed to be universalist 
and thus required to project influence beyond the borders and regions. During the 
Cold War, one of the areas where the “cold” conflict between the two superpowers 
gained a solid image was their rivalry in the periphery, i.e. in the so-called Third 
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World. In this sense, this area of conflict constitutes an important aspect of the scope 
of this study in order that the issue will have a more concrete meaning in the context.  
Towards the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the United 
States became war allies against the common enemy, Germany, which, according to 
Boyle, evoked sympathy for the Soviet Union on the American side as it was 
Russians who took the load of the most important frontline in the war and resulted in 
some appeasement steps towards the Soviet Union.
34
   
The relations which reached their peak with the decision to open a second 
front in France, which the Soviet Union expected for a long time, in 1944 began to 
lose impetus after the war. The fact that the Soviet Union sought to go beyond its 
borders towards Eastern Europe and the belief among the U.S. policymakers that 
making concessions (particularly expanding Lend-Lease Aid for the Soviet Union, 
which Roosevelt was planning in order to show the goodwill to cooperate after the 
war) would make the U.S. appear weak affected the progress of the relations 
negatively.
35
  
On the other hand, according to Gaddis, the post-war period, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union was expecting economics to shape politics, although it 
turned out to be otherwise as the disagreements over Eastern Europe and the credits 
offered to the Soviet Union highly affected their economic policies. In the face of the 
reluctance of the United States to extend loans, the Soviet Union did not become a 
member of the Bretton Woods system. At this point, Gaddis arrives to the conclusion 
that what was done to integrate the Soviets actually caused it to be isolated.
36
  
After the Second World War, as Gaddis points out, the United States was 
aware of the fact that the Soviets were probably going to fill the power vacuum after 
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the defeat of Russia despite the fact that it had not been its policy yet to project 
influence into Europe.
37
 In order to prevent Russian influence in the region, the 
United States aimed to “establish and maintain independent democratic regimes 
within both spheres and within the neutral zone.”38 Accordingly, the United States 
sought for assuring Moscow of its good intentions to persuade it not to look for a 
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, failure of which resulted in the conflictual 
incidents such as Iranian and Turkish Crises, Vietnam War, and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.
39
  
 The response of the United States to the expanding Soviet sphere of influence 
was the Marshall Doctrine, which aimed to create an economic balance in Europe by 
offering economic aid in Europe and to bring together the ideas of free trade and 
open markets within the framework of containment.
40
 On the other hand, having 
adhered to the Leninist ideas, the Soviet Union regarded the capitalist order as the 
root of World War II, which is evaluated by Gaddis as the inability of the Soviets 
that derived from ideology to judge the realities objectively. Forasmuch as the 
establishment of NATO demonstrated that capitalist states could cooperate with each 
other, contrary to the Soviet belief, this was not a cooperation between equals. 
41
  
 Thus, the ideological differences between two superpowers constituted a base 
for their conflictual relation during the Cold War. The capitalist ideology and 
communist ideology divided the world into two and opened a field for another aspect 
of the rivalry between them. Expanding Soviet sphere of influence faced with the 
efforts of the United States to increase the number of democracies in the reachable 
world by allocating loans for those countries.  
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 This chapter aimed to introduce the context in which the U.S.-Iranian 
relations will be handled throughout the study and to give very brief information 
about the Cold War dynamics. It would be fair to state that immense literature on the 
Cold War exists in both International Relations and History fields and they deal with 
detailed debates about the other dynamics of the U.S.-Soviet relations. However, this 
part of the study presented an overview of only a small part of this literature. The 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which started towards the 
end of the end of the 19
th
 century was shaped with the awareness of each other‟s 
different cultures and systems. Nevertheless, the real separation of their roads dates 
back to the end of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, which marked 
the ideological differences along with the clashes of geopolitical interests. The 
Second World War, where the United States and the Soviet Union took the same side 
against mutual enemies, ended with a crucial technological development: the Atomic 
bomb. The two superpowers, then, became again adversaries in another field, which 
launched a war between them where the only hot conflicts occurred in the periphery 
by their indirect involvement with economic aids and efforts to expand their 
ideologies beyond their spheres of influences, which also affected the events in Iran 
as well as all over the Middle East.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE U.S. –IRANIAN RELATIONS 
 
 
This chapter aims to give an insight on the relations between the United 
States and Iran from the establishment towards the Cold War, which determined a 
particular framework. First, Iran‟s position and relations with the West before the 
Second World War is discussed and the encounter of the United States and Iran is 
handled with an analysis of the early relations between the two countries, established 
after the occupation of Iran by the British and Soviet forces. Then, the evolution of 
the relations during the Cold War, the importance of the Middle East and Iran in 
particular for the United States is explained and the foreign policy of the United 
States towards Iran and its effects on the internal dynamics of Iran are discussed. 
Finally, the importance of oil that constituted one of the core issues in the U.S. 
Iranian relations, the oil nationalization project of Iran and the U.S. response to this 
policy and the hostage crisis on the eve of the revolution is examined in the final 
parts of the chapter. 
 
3.1. Iran before the Second World War 
As the First World War ended, the position of Iran in the region was an 
unprecedented one and undoubtedly it brought devastation to the country, which 
 21 
declared its neutrality after the war began.
42
 The Ottoman Empire, with which it had 
strong historical ties collapsed and the region began to be dominated by the Western 
powers, particularly Britain. British forces were in occupation of most of the Middle 
East, to which London attributed great importance for its connection with and 
dominance of its colonies.
43
 Thus, Iran was in the heart of the British interest and the 
other powers as a “battlefield”.44 It had been a focal point for Great Power rivalry. 
Russia‟s expansionist policies and its goal to export and import from the Persian Gulf 
clashed with Britain‟s need to preserve its contact with the Eastern Mediterranean.45 
Thus, it was Britain and Russia that particularly wanted to consolidate their influence 
in Iran. Russia invaded the northern part of the country, while British forces were in 
occupation of the south.  
By 1917, almost all of Iran was occupied by the British and Russian forces 
until the March Revolution. Despite the fact that Russian forces withdrew, the areas 
previously occupied by Russia were taken over by Britain and the devastating effects 
of the post-war conditions continued to increase for Iran. Additionally, the new, 
Bolshevik government of Russia renounced the treaties signed by the Tsarist Russia 
and concessions taken from Iran.  
Contrary to the relatively friendly relations with Soviet Russia, Iran had 
increasingly hostile relations with Britain, which sought to consolidate its influence 
with a treaty that gave the right to Britain to aid Iran financially, to send advisers and 
officers to Iran.  As Lenczowski put forward, Britain‟s active involvement in Iran, by 
having a strong impact on its internal politics, attracted the reaction of Iranian 
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nationalists and democrats, which resulted in the refusal of the treaty signed by 
Prime Minister Mirza Hassan Vosuq ad-Dauleh, who was overthrown by a coup 
conducted by Reza Khan, a Cossack brigade commander and Sayyid Zia Tabatabai, a 
pro-British journalist. 
 
3.1.1. The Rise of Reza Shah to the Throne 
The coup by Reza Khan and Tabatabai in 1921 constituted a turning point in 
Iranian history. Under the conditions of de-centralized administration, Reza Khan 
and Tabatabai took over the government, appointing Tabatabai as the prime minister 
and Reza Khan as the minister of war. The new government primarily sought to 
rebuild centralization by defeating insurgents and improving their relations with the 
central government.
46
 According to Keddie, in spite of the fact that government 
rendered Western interference “more indirect”, the main goal of Reza Khan was not 
conducting social reforms for the sake of the people but maintaining centralization 
through some measures, whereas Sayyed Zia, who abrogated the Anglo-Persian 
Treaty, which allowed Britain to directly interfere in Iranian affairs, promised a 
comprehensive social reform.
47
 During the following years, Reza Khan continued to 
consolidate his power putting himself ahead of the prime minister with the support of 
both the military and civilian groups. As Abrahamian argued in his book, it was the 
civilian groups backing of Reza Khan that provided his way to the throne to be a 
peaceful one.
48
 However, it is a fact that popular outbreaks took place within a year 
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after the government change. These outbreaks were suppressed by the armed forces, 
which were restructured by Reza Khan.
49
 
On the civilian side, the Revival Party, which was the majority party in the 
Fifth Parliament, was in contact with Reza Khan and they were mutually helping 
each other. This party‟s program called for: 
separation of religion from politics, creation of a well-disciplined army 
and a well administered bureaucracy, an end to economic capitulations, 
industrialization, replacement of foreign capital by native capital, 
transformation of nomads into farmers, a progressive income tax, 
expansion of educational facilities for all, including women, careers open 
to talent and replacement of minority languages throughout Iran by 
Persian.
50
 
 
With the help of journals and newspapers they bought off they sought to spread the 
idea of getting rid of the “royal dictatorship” while supporting the need of a 
“revolutionary dictatorship”.51 Nonetheless, Reza Khan‟s election as prime minister 
was during a coalition government between the Revival Party and the Socialist Party. 
Even though, at this period, the actions of the government particularly on the 
economy found support among the people, some political actions were criticized as 
attacks on the monarchy and the holy shari‟a by the mudarres.52 However, in the 
year 1925, Reza Khan managed to create a serious public opinion supporting him to 
the throne instead of Ahmad Shah of the Qajar dynasty, about whom rumors were 
spreading out about his life in Paris at that time. Eventually, Reza Khan found 
enough support to assume the throne in 1926.  
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3.1.2. Foreign and Domestic Politics under Reza Shah 
As Ghods argued, Reza Khan‟s turning into the Shah of Iran was a result of 
the revival of nationalism during the political chaos after the First World War. 
53
 In 
this period, Iran had become a disintegrated country, the minorities of which, 
particularly Azerbaijan, were seeking to separate themselves from Tehran. 
Furthermore, as a result of foreign interference, it was under a great pressure 
economically, which also caused resentment among Iranians.  
In this context, the political parties with which Reza Khan cooperated on his 
road to the throne knew to attract support from the people by promising a more 
centralized government, both a culturally and economically stronger Iran and took 
the support of the majority. And Reza Khan took over the throne in 1926 through the 
path opened by the government while he was the prime minister. 
According to Zirinsky, the instability in the country was fueled by the 
presence of the external forces.
54
 After World War I, with the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, Germany and Russia, Britain immediately occupied Iran and it 
interfered on each domain of the Iranian affairs. In this respect, Zirinsky 
distinguished four ways in which Iranian leaders responded to British domination: a 
pro-British policy, a pro-Russian policy, a third-power policy and isolation.
55
 In spite 
of the fact that Sayyed Zia was formerly pro-British, Zirinksy argued that Britain had 
no direct and intended effect on the 1921 coup and Reza Khan‟s becoming the Shah. 
Similarly, Keddie suggested that there is not any written evidence confirming British 
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involvement in the coup, but she also added that some British politicians had 
individually affected the progress.
56
 
On the other hand, in his book, Cottam attributed more importance to British 
influence in the 1921 coup. In this respect, Cottam argued that Britain wanted “a 
stable regime able to resist popular agitation, entirely friendly to Great Britain, 
protective of British interests, and able and willing to resist Russian threat”.57 
Nevertheless, Cottam also added that despite the British support in his rise to power, 
Reza Khan did not become the administrator that Britain hoped for and he did not 
look out for British interests in his actions. In 1921, for instance, the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement was nullified by Sayyid Zia and a treaty of friendship was signed with the 
Soviet Union. However, although Britain lost control inside Iran after Reza Shah‟s 
rise to power, the eventual results of the policies of Reza Shah were in favor of the 
interests of Britain until a critical preference of Reza Shah in the late 1930s to 
consider Adolf Hitler as a third power to collaborate against Britain and Russia. 
Increasing trade with, technical assistance and diplomatic support of Germany 
became a balancing act until Germany‟s cooperation with Russia in 1941.58  
Besides, as it is noted before, although the Bolshevik Revolution interrupted 
Russian intervention, Soviet Russia continued its existence in Iran soon after its 
military withdrawal because of economic reasons and ideological concerns. The First 
World War and Bolshevism in Russia brought rivalry in to Anglo-Russian relations, 
which Iran could have used for its own benefit. Nevertheless, Soviet expansionism, 
both with its ideological and geopolitical aspects became a more obvious danger. The 
north of Iran was occupied by the Soviets and a puppet regime that had ties with 
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Moscow was constituted there. Thus, Moscow seemed to be a more important threat 
to the independence of Iran.
59
  
However, according to Cottam, despite the fact Reza Shah was considered to 
be a “product” of a coup sponsored by Britain, the Soviets did not want to damage 
relations with Iran and preferred to conduct its ideological influence on political life 
and through economic relations.
60
  
On the other hand, as it is mentioned before, Iran saw the United States as a 
counterbalance against Britain and Russia. Not interested in Iran until British and 
Russian interventions, the United States had policies with ideological and economic 
goals. Nevertheless, for Iran, the United States was seen as the primary power to help 
Iran have its own say in its own country. This “idealized” view was mainly supported 
by the American advisers aiming to assist Iran to establish its own institutions.
61
 
On the domestic realm, Reza Shah managed to form a strong autocratic 
government with constitutional rules. As the Iranians considered that Reza Shah 
aptly stood against the external pressures, he was given extraordinary powers as 
well.
62
  
Hence, when the foreign policy of Reza Shah is taken into consideration, it 
can be stated that despite his nationalistic aspirations, he established balance with 
external powers, i.e. Britain, Russia, the United States and also Germany, so as to 
both maintain a stable independence and to obtain well-established institutions as 
well, particularly with the help of advisers sent by the United States, some of whom 
Iran had trusted very much and some of whom it had not good relations. In this 
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context, Griffith describes the foreign policy of Reza Shah as nationalistic and he 
argues that the foreign policy framework was taken over by his son, Mohammad 
Reza Shah. This framework linked internal strength with independence and thereby 
attributed great importance to the modernization of the army and infrastructure. In 
addition, diminishing the influence of Moscow and London was another goal of this 
foreign policy framework. To this end, Iran‟s quest for a counterbalancing third force 
caused Iran to get close to first the United States and Germany.
63
 Nonetheless, as the 
Second World War was approaching, the rapprochement between Reza Shah and 
Hitler, in terms of economic and political relations engendered disturbance on the 
British and Russian side, which led the way to another change in the throne, 
replacing Reza Shah with his son, Mohammad Reza Shah in 1941, when World War 
II was going on.  
 
3.2. U.S. and Iranian Relations: World War II and Cold War Period 
 
3.2.1. Iran during World War II and the Cold War 
When the Second World War broke out, Iran preferred to remain neutral and 
this policy of neutrality highly disturbed the Allies.
64
 However, it was Reza Shah‟s 
quest for a third power to guarantee the independence of Iran and his relations with 
Germany, which led to an invasion by Great Britain and the Soviet Union and Reza 
Shah‟s being sent to exile.65 Just before his exile, Reza Shah left his place to his son 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi on September 14, 1941. The new shah was following 
in his father‟s footsteps in that his primary goal was the independence of Iran from 
                                                 
63
 Griffith, 370. 
64
 Cottam, 55. 
65
 J.A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988), 18. 
 28 
external forces. During the Second World War, the main purpose of Mohammad 
Reza Shah was to minimize the Anglo-Soviet influence that was augmented with the 
occupation. As his father did, the Shah sought the support of a third power that 
would counterbalance the two occupying countries. The alternative to Germany was 
considered to be the United States. Iran encouraged Washington to intervene in the 
situation in Iran on many occasions. On the U.S. side, the foreign policy makers were 
becoming more interested in Iran for both economic and political reasons that will be 
discussed in the following sections. One of the results of these efforts to make the 
U.S. involved in Iran and the decisions to get more interested in Iran was a tripartite 
treaty. With the initiative of the United States, the Shah signed a Tripartite Treaty 
with the Soviet Union and Britain on January 29, 1942. This treaty guaranteed the 
territorial sovereignty and political independence of Iran, required the withdrawal of 
the Allied forces not later than six months after the end of the war and also promised 
economic aid so as to compensate for the wartime deprivations. Furthermore, it 
constituted the beginning of a change in Iranian wartime foreign policy.
66
 According 
to Ramazani, after the treaty, the neutrality of Iran was increasingly attacked by 
Britain and Russia. Besides, the interests of the United States and Britain became 
more definite as Russian influence and domination began to intensify. As Bill put 
forward in his book, this treaty of guarantee did not alleviate the fears of the Shah 
and Iranian statesmen who opted for the presence of a third power influence in Iran. 
Thus, Iran was willing to render the treaty a four-party treaty, with the inclusion of 
the United States. However, Tehran did not succeed in doing so. Nevertheless, 
instead of being a party to the treaty, the United States preferred to further its 
bilateral relations with Iran. With the treaties of trade and its advisory teams sent to 
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Iran to assist in establishing effective institutions and infrastructure consolidated the 
American involvement in Iran.  
When World War II ended, the Iranian foreign policy primarily aimed ending 
Soviet and British presence in Iran. Britain agreed to withdraw from Iranian 
territories that it occupied, whereas the Soviet Union managed to postpone the 
withdrawal of its troops in defiance of the treaty. The most important support for Iran 
to persuade the Soviets to withdraw came from the United States, which also 
consolidated the U.S. presence in Iran as a guarantee of independence in the eyes of 
the Iranian decision makers.  
Independence was the supreme goal of all Iranian people and the Iranian 
decision makers as well. Nevertheless, the means to achieve it was a question of 
debate among the Iranian politicians. The clearest confrontation on the issue was 
between the Shah and Dr. Mohammad Mossaddegh, who was elected prime minister 
in 1951. Dr. Mossadegh was a popular parliamentarian in the Iranian majlis when the 
foundations of the constitutional monarchy were being laid in 1949.
67
 The prime 
ministers nominated by the Shah were not considered to be effective particularly in 
oil politics. Thus, a passionate nationalist and orator, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh 
found great popular support by favoring nationalization of the Iranian economy, 
particularly the oil resources of the country, which were mainly under the control of 
Britain through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) founded in 1909. 
Furthermore, Dr. Mossadegh supported the idea that both Britain and Russia were 
the enemies of Iran; hence the most convenient foreign policy strategy for Iran was 
neutralism. Thus, he also opposed the idea that Iran needed a third foreign power in 
order to gain its independence. On the other hand, for the Shah and his entourage, the 
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real opponent of Iran was Soviet Russia, in terms of both politics and economy, the 
United States was the real ally that would back up Iran against Russia.  
In his memoirs, where he wrote about his policies, Mohammad Reza Shah 
commented also on the premiership of Mossadegh.
68
 The Shah criticized Mossadegh 
of not being cautious and of reversing the “positive balance” strategy of Iran into a 
“negative balance” by ruling out concessions to any foreign power, which caused 
Iranian oil trade to end.
69
 In this respect, Griffith finds the policy of the Shah “more 
realistic and more in accord with Iranian national interests”, because Mossadegh 
neglected his country‟s and Britain‟s post-war weaknesses.70 Although Mossadegh 
resigned after the Shah refused to appoint him as the minister of war, the popular 
riots against the nomination of Ahmad Ghavam again forced the Shah to appoint 
Mossadegh as the prime minister and minister of war in 1952. Nevertheless, the 
decline in the support for the Prime Minister and the revival of the Tudeh Party and 
anxiety about communism prepared the decline of Mossadegh. The difference 
between the Shah and Mossaddegh was not only about policies, but also about the 
whole political system of Iran.
71
 Moreover, Mossadegh was not in favor of the 
modernization program like the Shah was. Cooperating with CIA and the U.S. 
ambassador in Tehran, Loy W. Henderson, the Shah accelerated the period during 
which anti-Mossadegh demonstrations took place.
72
 Britain was willing to stop 
Mossadegh to reverse the nationalization of the AIOC and to prevent Soviet 
influence that was increasing in Iran through the Tudeh Party. Fazlollah Zahedi 
succeeded Mossadegh as the new prime minister and Mossadegh stood trial.  
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Besides, the Shah referred to the foreign relations of Iran with other countries 
and he particularly mentioned the aid that Iran received from the United States. The 
Truman doctrine, which aimed to consolidate the American presence in the Middle 
East, included Iran in its area of influence as well. With this doctrine, in 1948, Iran 
began to receive military aid from the United States. The military aid included “light 
armaments with a view to put Iran‟s threatened security”.73 The economic assistance 
from the United States had its roots back in the beginning of the 18
th
 century and was 
conducted by American missions sent to Iran.
74
  
Furthermore, the Cold War foreign policy strategy of the Shah required 
alignment with the United States. The newly-founded pro-Soviet regime in Iraq after 
the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the pan-Arabist and pro-Soviet policies 
of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdelnasser posed threats to the Shah‟s position. 
Thus, one of the reasons for Iran to be aligned with the United States was this danger 
perceived by the Shah.
75
  
When the détente period began between the Soviet Union and the Unites 
States in the late 1960s, the Shah perceived the development as both a danger and 
opportunity in that the two hegemonies might decide the fate of Iran regardless of the 
Shah‟s opinions and the Soviet threat, according to which Iran„s preference for one 
party might be to no avail.
76
 Hence, in spite of the fact that Iran preserved its position 
in the Western camp, it did not need the immediate financial and military assistance 
of the United States any more. In addition, it began to normalize its relations with the 
Soviet Union and China. Another dimension that affected the Shah‟s foreign policy 
was Iran‟s leadership in the Persian Gulf, after Britain withdrew from Persian Gulf 
                                                 
73
 Pahlavi, 81. 
74
 Ramazani, 76. 
75
 Griffith, 374. 
76
 Griffith, 376. 
 32 
sheikhdoms, which made Iranian oil the base of rising Iranian prosperity and 
power.
77
 When it came to the year 1973, Iran quadrupled its oil prices. As Griffith 
put forward, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the decrease in the Arab oil production 
encouraged Iran to make the move, which resulted in an increase in national 
development in Iran.   
 
3.2.2. The United States in Iran 
The first relations between Iran and the United States began with Protestant 
missionary activities and for many years Iran remained unknown to many 
Americans.
78
 The missionary activities that aimed mainly at conversion through the 
educational, health and similar social services began in 1830s and in 1883 Iran and 
the United States exchanged diplomatic representatives.
79
 In 1856, formal relations 
were inaugurated with a treaty of friendship and commerce
80
 In spite of the fact that 
soon after the breakout of the First World War and beginning of the rivalry between 
Russia and Britain attracted some attention, U.S. influence and interest in the region 
remained at a minimum level until the Second World War, when the United States 
began to make its presence felt. Additionally, the role of petroleum was understood 
to be crucial for great powers and Iran, under the intervention of Russia and Britain 
was actively encouraging the United States to be involved in Iran as a 
counterbalance.  
From the side of the United States, it was also appropriate to get involved 
more in Iranian affairs as far as its interests were concerned.
81
 At the Tehran 
Conference in 1943, the United States under the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
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assured Tehran that it would support the independence of Iran after the war. As a 
matter of fact, it was to make sure that British and Russian forces withdrew from 
Iranian territories that had been occupied.
82
 As Moens put forward, while the Shah 
was using American influence in maintaining a balance against Britain and Russia, 
the United States had its own interests in getting involved in Iran. First of all, Iran 
constituted a buffer against the Soviet Union. Secondly, Iran was an important link 
for the U.S. to oilfields of the Gulf region. Furthermore, later on Iran played a key 
role with its location in intelligence of the U.S. on Soviet missile testing in Central 
Asia.
83
 Thus, the United States shaped its foreign policy towards Iran within these 
parameters. On March 10, 1942, one of the first steps revealing the orientation of 
U.S. foreign policy was Iran‟s being declared as eligible for lend-lease aid, which 
provided the Allies with war materials.
84
  
Moreover, as of 1942, the United States began to send advisers to Iran upon 
the request of the Shah, who had confidence in the United States in that it would 
provide a secure base for the independence of Iran, like other Iranian statesmen. The 
first of the advisory teams sent to Iran was a diplomatic group headed by Louis 
Dreyfus, Jr. The legation of Dreyfus was a center of coordination of American 
presence and it was directly linked to the Department of State. Between 1942 and 
1947, another mission, this time a military one, was sent to Iran under the command 
of Gen. Clarence Ridley, which was followed by another military mission, the 
Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC), headed by Gen. Donald Connolly. The 
PGSC consisted of thirty thousand non-combatant troops and helped USSR get 
wartime supplies through Iran. In addition to these, a third military mission to Iran 
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was led by Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and aimed to assist the gendarmerie forces 
of Iran. In 1943, Arthur C. Millspaugh came to Iran again for a financial advisory 
mission, which was not welcomed by a wide range of Iranians and Soviet opposition 
because of his reform plans for Iranian financial organization. Furthermore, apart 
from these official missions, there was also individual and informal American 
influence as well, among which the advisory works of Gen. Patrick Hurley may be 
counted.
85
 Despite the lack of coordination and agreement among the teams, 
particularly because of the tension between Millspaugh and Connolly, these missions 
served to increase support for more American influence and also caused some 
resentment among two Iranian groups, first the wealthy class due to the financial 
reforms were found damaging to their interest and secondly the nationalists because 
of the excessive power and authorization given to the American missions. As 
Ramazani argued, the missions also posed problems in that the status of missions 
was ambiguous.
86
 The missions were the employee of the Iranian state and they were 
also serving American interests at the same time and their ambiguity as well as their 
excessive authority caused them to be an issue of opposition.  
As it was mentioned before, the United States did not pay much attention to 
Iran until the Second World War and began to be interested due the reasons given 
above. One of the first acts proving the interest of the United States was the Tehran 
Conference, as a result of which the three powers, i.e. the United States, Britain and 
Soviet Union, declared that they supported the independence and territorial integrity 
of Iran when the war ended. The goal of the conference for the United States was to 
prevent Moscow from remaining there as a permanent political hegemon.
87
 
Nonetheless, the Soviets did not comply with the declaration and exceeded the 
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withdrawal deadline. Thus, the most powerful support for Iran on Soviet withdrawal 
came from the United States and Moscow was persuaded to withdraw from the 
territories it occupied in mid-1946.  
As Ganji aptly put it, the U.S. relations with Iran in the Cold War period was 
based on the rivalry with the Soviet Union, which was broadly discussed in Chapter 
2 and the oil resources of the Middle East.
88
 Until the end of the Second World War, 
Britain and the Soviet Union dominated the region and particularly Iran. As a result 
of the counterbalancing strategy of Iran, the United States was involved more and 
more in the Iranian affairs and filled the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Britain at 
the end of World War II. The Soviet Union withdrew in consequence of the 
persuasion of the United States and the United Nations. One should not overlook, 
however, the fine-tuned diplomacy that Iran conducted vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in 
that period. Ahmad Qavam, the prime minister of Iran at that time, had promised the 
Soviet Union establishment of an Irano-Soviet Oil Company, entrance of at least 
three members of Tudeh Party to the parliament and privileges to Azerbaijani 
separatists in order to persuade Moscow to withdraw its troops. However, when the 
Iranian parliament objected to such a company in 1947 as Qavam was sure it would, 
it was too late for the Soviet Union to launch another war for oil as it was victorious 
but devastated after the Second World War.
89
   
In the post-war period, the arms race between the Soviet Union and the 
United States and the ideological confrontation between the two superpowers carried 
over to the Middle East as well. The Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine and 
lastly the Nixon Doctrine were formed to increase the influence of the United States 
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in the Middle East. As a Middle Eastern country with vast oil reserves and a fragile 
political atmosphere, Iran received economic and military aids through these 
doctrines in order to consolidate its military and infrastructure against the Soviet 
threat. Thus, the primary goals and concerns of the United States and Iran overlapped 
in the Cold War period. For the Shah, the most important danger towards Iran was 
the communist threat and for the United States, it was also communist ideology that 
posed the main threat to its position in the Middle East.  
In the post-war period, the Shah aligned himself with the United States. 
Nevertheless, according to Ganji he knew to benefit from the rivalry between 
Washington and Moscow.
90
 In 1959, Iran launched a policy of détente with the 
Soviet Union and it pressured the Eisenhower administration to sell more military 
equipment to Iran. Iran‟s increasing power in the Gulf region during the Vietnam 
War and Britain‟s withdrawal from the region was considered to be worrying to the 
Johnson administration. However, when Iran became a power in the region, the 
United States wanted Iran to be built up as a regional power.
91
  
The Nixon administration was in favor of supporting the Shah and President 
Richard Nixon agreed to sell all kinds of weaponry to Iran, except nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, Nixon and Henry Kissinger also supported Iran in its high oil price policy 
considering that would subdue the other rivals in financial terms, i.e. West Germany 
and Japan.  
The patron-client relationship between Iran and the United States was 
initiated by the Eisenhower administration‟s New Look strategy, which was set forth 
in 1953. The goal of the New Look was to regain the initiative against the Soviet 
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Union and to reduce the defense expenditures of the United States.
92
 To this end, it 
also required to strengthen pro-Western countries in the periphery of Soviet sphere of 
influence. Accordingly, the economic and military aid granted to the Middle Eastern 
countries increased to a large extent. One of these countries was Iran, with its fragile 
political and economic atmosphere and strategic importance in the region. As 
Gasiorowski argued, the strategy had initially defensive aims, yet after the overthrow 
of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, it planned on to transform Iran an anti-
Communist state rather than a “neutral” one. The view was followed by the Kennedy 
administration as well with some changes. The soft side of the strategy known as 
“flexible response”93 gave more importance to the conventional forces, economic aid 
and cultural programs.
94
 While the Johnson administration was overly occupied with 
the Vietnam War and Arab-Israeli Conflict, the interaction with Iran, economic aid 
and military aid was reduced in mid-1960s, which also decreased the ability of the 
U.S. to control the policies of the Shah. 
The Nixon administration, with the guidance of Henry Kissinger, put forward 
the Nixon Doctrine. This doctrine required to avoid getting involved in proxy wars 
with the Soviet Union and heavily arming its clients in the Third World.
95
 Iran 
became the main focus of the Nixon Doctrine due to its position in the region. Hence, 
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under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States sold considerable amounts of weaponry 
to Iran and encouraged Iran to become a powerful state in the region.  
Gaining military power in the region, Iran assumed that it was increasingly 
more equal to the United States but for Washington it was not easy to control Tehran 
by the time Jimmy Carter took office. Before a consistent policy towards Iran was 
shaped, the signs of revolution appeared in Iran and beginning with the hostage crisis 
in 1979, triggered with sixty six Americans‟ being taken hostage, the relations 
between the United State and Iran deteriorated. 
 
3.2.3. Oil 
 The importance of oil was recognized with the end of the First World War by 
the states that wanted to be powerful. Thus, the oil reserves of the Middle East 
attracted attention of the Western countries, particularly that of Britain.  
 The first oil resource in Iran was found in 1908 in the province of Khuzestan 
and the first oil concession was granted to William Knox D‟Arcy, who was a British 
millionaire. Iran was the first non-Western country where oil was found and used for 
commercial purposes. In the 1920s the Western companies began to seek 
concessions in Iran. Standard Oil Company (today‟s Exxon), Sinclair Oil, Seaboard 
Oil Company and Standard-Vacuum Oil (today‟s Mobil) were the first companies 
that demonstrated interest in Iranian oil.
96
  
 Since its discovery, oil played a crucial role in the Iranian political life, both 
in the domestic and international realm. When the first oil was found, the first 
concession was given to a British Company and Britain bought most of the shares of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. At that time, the British fleet was converting from 
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coal to oil. Hence, the core of the British concerns in Iran was about oil and its 
strategic importance.
97
 According to the Iranian people, the coup of 1921 took place 
with the intervention of Britain so as to preserve its interest in the AIOC.
98
 Most of 
the shares of the AIOC belonged to Britain and the company paid minimum taxes 
and duties to the Iranian state, whereas it paid income taxes and import duties to 
Britain. Moreover, the directorship of the company was at the hands of Britain. The 
company accounts were checked by the British officials. In Rubin‟s words, “AIOC 
became a state within the state, controlling Persia‟s main resource and intervening in 
Persian politics.”99 The British domination in the oil production and politics of Iran 
caused it to approach the United States in order to lessen the British monopoly.  
However, the United States had little interest in the region because it did not want to 
challenge Britain‟s primacy in the region and secondly, it found Iran too peripheral 
in which to be interested. It was not until 1944 that the United States decided that it 
had to send representatives of oil companies to Iran. 
 Similarly, the Soviet Union was also concerned about the oil resources 
particularly of northern Iran. Almost at the same time with the negotiations with the 
United States, the Soviet ambassador Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze asked for 
exclusive rights over the petroleum exploration in the north of Iran. This initiative 
resulted in suspension of all oil concessions negotiations until the end of the war and 
further deterioration in Russo-Iranian relations.
100
 The opposition to the oil 
concessions was represented by the politician in the Iranian parliament such as Prime 
Minister Mohammad Sa‟id, who had to resign from the Tudeh Party as the 
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consequence of the suppression, Sayyid Zia, who was a pro-British politician and 
lastly Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who later played a crucial role in the 
nationalization of oil sources of Iran.
101
 On December 2, 1944, Mossadegh took a 
step further from the suspension of the negotiations and suggested that Iranian oil 
should be explored by Iranians themselves. On the same day, the bill passed in the 
majlis and prohibited discussing and signing oil concession agreements by any 
government.  
 The nationalization process in the so-called Third World began in the early 
1940s. Venezuela demanded higher shares for its oil resource and Saudi Arabia 
launched similar negotiations that resulted in a fifty-fifty agreement in 1950. 
Likewise, in Iran demonstrations were held and strikes were organized in the oil 
fields. Referring to a document prepared by the government in 1948, Bill listed the 
dissatisfaction of Iran in six items:  
(1) the amount of revenues accruing to the government of Iran; (2) the 
supplying of the British Royal Admiralty and Royal Air Force with 
Iranian oil at an advantageous price; (3) the demand that Iran receive its 
share of the profits from the company‟s operations outside of Iran; (4) 
the need to have access to the accounts and ledgers of the company since 
these figures affected Iran; (5) the improvement of the status of the 
Iranian employees of the company; and (6) the revision of the length of 
the concession.
102
  
 
 In mid-1950, a commission under the leadership of Mossadegh rejected the 
fifty-fifty offer of the AIOC. Despite the opposition of the Prime Minister Haj Ali 
Razmara, who was assassinated during the negotiations, the Iranian majlis passed the 
bill to nationalize the oil industry of Iran on March 15, 1951 and Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadegh became prime minister on April 29.
103
 The nationalization policy brought 
Britain to the edge of attacking Iran. Nevertheless, the United States wanted to 
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persuade Britain to compromise in a fear of Soviet involvement. The United States, 
yet it did not manage to “bridge the gap between Britain and Iran.”104 As Heiss 
argued, the dispute became irresolvable as the two sides saw it through their own 
history and neither wanted to take a step back as opposed to the other one.
105
 
 The American position in Iran was also in danger in that the other oil 
producing countries may follow Iran and take the same approach towards the 
American companies. As the oil crisis continued, the United States changed its 
position as well. The concern about the status of American companies and about a 
possible Soviet expansion in the oil fields caused Washington to decide to be on the 
same side with Britain and before Eisenhower took office, the overthrow of 
Mossadegh began to be discussed.
106
  
 
3.2.4. Overthrowing Mossadegh 
 In 1953, CIA and Britain planned to overthrow Mossadegh through a coup 
and to replace him with the Shah, who left the country as part of the plan.
107
 Both 
Rubin
108
 and Bill
109
 emphasize that the American intervention of 1953 marked a 
turning point in the U.S.-Iranian relations in that it created such resentment that 
Iranians used the event to justify their seizure of the American Embassy in 1979.  
 The coup organized in cooperation between Britain and the United States 
began in February 1953. Ruehsen points to three actors in the United States who 
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were interested in the problem.
110
 President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles and the head of the CIA Allan Dulles. All of the three figures were 
concerned about the spread of communism and they did not want Iran to go bankrupt 
as it would render the Middle East more open to the dangers. As Rubin states in his 
book, CIA under Allen Dulles was closer to the White House and it was more 
enthusiastic about foreign coups and the overthrow of Mossadegh was one of the first 
operations of that kind.
111
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the coordination of the 
coup plan was assumed by the United States, British intelligence also played an 
important role. The United States preferred to get involved in the coup under the 
conditions of the Cold War. The Soviet expansionism was still the primary threat for 
the United States in the region and in Europe. Thus, it needed to have good relations 
with France and Britain. Furthermore, it should be noted that some authors also argue 
that the United States collaborated with Britain in order to end its dominance over 
the Iranian oil and to have a share.
112
  
 The negotiations between Iran and Britain broke down and the belief in the 
necessity of the coup was increasing. Neither Mossadegh, who did not want to give 
up so easily as it would be a “political suicide” nor did Britain want to compromise 
unless their own solution was accepted.
113
 Nonetheless, proposals prepared by the 
United States and Britain were presented to Mossadegh. A final proposal suggested 
that  
Iran would retain control of the country‟s oil industry provided that fair 
and adequate compensation be paid to AIOC and the Americans would 
provide immediate loans which could be repaid with oil.
114
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 Mossadegh rejected the proposal and tried to persuade the United States that Britain 
wanted to get Americans out of the Middle East and used the Communist threat to 
persuade the U.S. to be on his side.
115
 In Iran, the Shah was protesting Mossadegh by 
threatening to go to exile and the rumors were causing pro-Shah demonstrations 
subsidized by Col. Norman Schwarzkopf. However, the majority of the Iranian 
people continued to support Mossadegh and his government was not likely to fall.
116
 
On the other hand, Mossadegh knew that the military was still loyal to the Shah, 
which made him ask for the full control of the army. This move caused him to lose 
some support of the parliamentarians. Secondly, when many deputies resigned, he 
threatened to dissolve the parliament and he lost his base of power in the parliament, 
which increased Tudeh support for him. Meanwhile, anti-American and anti-British 
demonstrations were increasing in number as well.  
 Hence, an alternative solution to the negotiations had to be found. Referring 
to his book Countercoup, Cottam asserts that Kermit Roosevelt, an intelligence 
officer who was charged with the duty of conducting the coup, claimed the 
overthrow of Mossadegh as his main responsibility.
117
 Accordingly, Kermit 
Roosevelt had an important role in organizing the operation. He was called to 
London and proposed to cooperate during the operation, which was called 
“Operation Ajax”, as an extension of the “Operation Boot” planned by MI6, the 
British intelligence service. As a part of the plan, the Shah issued two royal decrees 
that dismissed Mossadegh and appointed General Fazlollah Zahedi in his place. At 
first the plan seemed to have failed and the Shah left the country in mid-August. 
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However, the operation was completed successfully and Mossadegh was arrested. 
The Shah returned and was restored to the throne.
118
  
 
3.2.5. Post-1953 Iran 
 As Ferrier argued, the 1953 crisis was not beneficial to Iran in that as Iranian 
oil was not essential in the world market, Iran was deprived of the revenues of AIOC, 
which was approximately $200,000,000 a year.
119
  Furthermore, the event constituted 
a turning point in Iran‟s foreign and domestic politics. First of all, the intervention by 
American and British intelligence services caused irritation among the Iranians. As it 
is stated before, it became the base for the other crises between the Western countries 
and Iran. Secondly, as of 1953, the policies of the Shah proved to be both more 
dependent on the United States and more independent at the same time. It was more 
dependent because he needed the United States for his immediate survival and the 
economic and military aid from the United States was necessary for his development 
programs.
120
 On the other hand, it was more independent due to his new system of 
ruling and modernizing the country through the White Revolution and an 
organization called SAVAK. Translated as Secret Security Organization, SAVAK 
was set up by the Shah as a system of spying and policing soon after regaining the 
throne, in 1957. The organization was founded by the assistance of the United States 
and Israel also contributed to its operations.
121
 In the domestic realm, SAVAK was 
considered to be a police-state instrument for its operations became ruthless and 
extreme.  
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 Through the effective means he had, the Shah almost destroyed the Tudeh 
Party and the National Front. The majlis formed as a result of a new election after the 
overthrow of Mossadegh was not representative in nature and there was a clear 
political discontent at home. On the international realm, Iran returned to the oil 
market with new arrangements made with the British and American governments. 
According to these arrangements, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was 
recognized by all parties. The British companies began to buy crude oil from the 
NIOC and sell it in the world market, half of the revenue of which was paid to NIOC. 
Thus, Iran obtained the control of its oil reserves and industry, whereas foreign 
companies continued their operations in Iran.
122
 Nonetheless, the arrangements were 
criticized by some nationalists and there is no consensus among the scholars on the 
interpretations of the arrangements.  
 The United States was clearly content with the results of the negotiations and 
arrangements. The Eisenhower administration continued to grant financial aid to 
Tehran. Between the years 1953 and 1960, the economic aid from the United States 
was $567 million and the military aid reached $450 million.
123
 By 1961, Iran became 
the recipient of one of the largest amounts of American economic aid. Moreover, 
many official advisors, experts, technical organizations and individual investors 
came to Iran to provide assistance in economic planning.
124
  
 Political pressure and resentment due to the close relationship between the 
Shah and the United States made Iranian people dissatisfied with the regime, which 
failed to improve the economic and social conditions of the people. Finally, in 1963, 
the Shah decided to launch a series of reform programs, which he called the “White 
Revolution” aiming to develop the socio-economic situation in the country. 
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Nevertheless, the revolution did not receive any support from the rural areas that 
were under the control of the feudal landlords and neither from the urban areas that 
were politically suppressed.
125
 The largest opposition to the White Revolution, 
however, came from the clergy. Land reforms created discomfort among the 
landlords who were generally the most important patrons of the mullahs. In addition, 
some of them disliked the Shah because of his father‟s policies and some of them 
were discontent about the close relations with the United States.
126
 Among those who 
opposed the reforms was Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini declared the reforms as a 
violation of Islamic law and he issued pamphlets announcing that the reform was 
contrary to Islamic principles. Under his leadership, theological students gathered for 
demonstrations in Qum, which has been a very religious city of Iran. SAVAK 
meddled in the demonstrations and occupied mosques, shrines and religious schools. 
On June 4, 1963, Khomeini was arrested, as a result of which crowds gathered to 
protest in Tehran. Although the figures change according to the authors, many people 
died during the demonstrations and many of them got injured.
127
  Not being able to 
find support from the people, the White Revolution lost its impetus. Although it was 
not a total failure, it could not fulfill its promises.
128
 
 
3.3. Iran before the Islamic Revolution 
 The White Revolution lasted fourteen years and it ameliorated the social 
situation in Iran to some extent. The literacy rate, particularly among the women and 
the education level was augmented fivefold and threefold respectively. The 
agricultural techniques were improved and the living standard of many families 
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increased. However, Iran was one of the countries that had the worst social 
conditions in the Middle East.
129
 The accelerated modernization, development 
programs and urbanization also increased the number of shanty towns, pollution and 
poverty. The lower classes of the society were not able to benefit from the social 
welfare programs. Infrastructure of the capital was not adequate. In brief, poverty 
was not overcome but just modernized and the gap between the social classes and 
inequalities enlarged, which also brought forth discontentment and opposition.  
 The Tudeh Party and the National Front were weakened after the 1953 coup 
through the operations of SAVAK. The social changes in Iran caused the target 
audience of the Tudeh Party decrease in numbers. The National Front reactivated 
itself after 1960, when the police controls were relaxed. However, when it began 
gaining support, its leaders were arrested again. Despite its collapse, the divisions of 
the party continued opposition, some of them through radicalized means.
130
  
 The most effective and powerful opposition group to the regime was the 
clergy. Abrahamian categorizes the clergy into three groups, the first of which 
consisted of apolitical ulama who wanted the clergy to remain out of politics.
131
 The 
second group was a moderate opposition group who particularly objected to the 
rights given to women but that was open to communication with the Shah. The last 
group was a militant opposition group headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in 
exile in Iraq but had a network in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini and his students had 
been imprisoned for a period of time and Khomeini lived in exile and had no 
communication with the regime. They aimed at an Islamic form of government and 
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denounced the Shah by comparing him to Yazid, who killed Hussein
132
. Unlike the 
second group, they were in favor of active involvement by the clergy in politics. 
Ayatollah Khomeini declared his theories and policies during his lectures and he 
criticized the West of being imperialist and the Shah of being their puppet.  
 Apart from the opposition groups, the social groups were also disturbed by 
the increasing inequalities and the negative results of rapid development and 
modernization. The middle class, highly influenced by the increased inflation rates, 
also suffered the operations of SAVAK.
133
 In 1977, a group of lawyers wrote a letter 
to the Shah calling for abolishment of despotism and the single party system. Later in 
the same year, poets, novelists and intellectuals wrote letters to the authorities 
denouncing the regime for violating human rights. The opposition of the middle class 
grew larger and more vocal. Street protests took place in Tehran and the other cities 
of Iran. Likewise, the working class was discontented because of economic 
recessions. In 1978, strikes and upheavals of the middle and working class became 
widespread and they were generally suppressed through violent methods by SAVAK, 
particularly after the declaration of martial law in Tehran and eleven other cities.
134
 
On September 8, the worst clashes occurred in Tehran, as a result of which more than 
4,000 people were killed, which caused the day be called “Black Friday”. The Black 
Friday completely ended the possibility of a compromise between the Shah and the 
people.  
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 By 1978, opposition gathered around the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
who had been exiled for over a decade. His students established a network to spread 
his ideas in Iran. Khomeini demanded a total Islamic revolution contrary to the other 
opposition groups. Yet, those various groups believed that they could overthrow the 
old cleric once the Shah was gone. The opposition became so powerful that the new 
cabinet appointed by the Shah did not suffice to secure the regime and the Shah had 
to flee Iran, as a result of which Khomeini‟s forces took power in February 1979 and 
the ayatollah returned to Tehran.
135
 
 
 3.4. The Hostage Crisis 
 The hostage crisis that lasted from November 4, 1979 until January 20, 1981 
constituted another turning point in the relations between the United States and Iran. 
The militants attacked the American Embassy in Tehran and captured sixty six 
Americans and kept them hostage for four hundred and forty four days. The incident 
created a shock among the Americans and as Farber so aptly put it, “the nation, itself, 
was held hostage by the crisis”.136 On the Iranian side, it became a symbol of 
independence and of the Iranians‟ power against the West, i.e. imperialism. 
 Political Islam in the region was thought to be unknown by the Americans. It 
was considered that the Carter administration was primarily concerned about the 
Soviet expansion in the region and the Cold War rivalry going on with the Soviets. 
However, it is now known that the United States had its politics over the political 
Islam burgeoning in the region, particularly with the guidance of National Security 
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Council Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.
137
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made 
this policy a long-term project that required supporting political Islam in the region. 
It is known that prioritizing the Cold War dynamics, the United States sold 
armaments to Islamic fundamentalists aiming to empower them against the Soviets. 
These militants were fed through Pakistan. Nevertheless, the support caused a 
blowback against the United States, when the Islamic groups eventually turned 
against the United States. However, in Iran, anti-Americanism had deep-seated roots. 
The rapid and rigorous modernization and secularization program of the Shah was 
immediately objected to by the clergy, especially by that headed by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who was in exile at that time. Along with the other opposing groups, the 
group that consisted of the students and supporters of Khomeini was in the streets, 
protesting the Shah and his pro-American and modernizing policies. Although 
Khomeini was not in Iran, his lectures and the pamphlets that he published called 
Iranians to struggle against the impious regime of the Shah. The demonstrations 
caused real bloodshed and casualties and finally the Shah had to leave Iran, still 
hoping to return as he had done in 1953.  
 The Shah left the country and flew first to Egypt and then to Morocco, while 
Khomeini returned to Iran in the meantime. Ayatollah Khomeini found strong 
support from the Iranians and he was seen as a means to overthrow the Shah by 
many opposition groups. These opposition groups were created as a result of a long 
history of experiences. The policies of Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah 
had caused resentment among many groups either due to their economic 
consequences or their religious or social influences. Moreover, the Anglo-Russian 
occupation that continued for years, the experience of having been an occupied 
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country, the direct intervention of the U.S. in the 1953 crisis and also the close 
relations with the United States despite this sensitivity made the people discontented 
with the regime. The oppressive policies of the last years were the final straw before 
the Shah went to the United States. The anti-Americanism and the increasing anti-
Shah feelings gathered all the opposition groups together. Thus, when the United 
States hosted the Shah, it became a reason to trigger the open conflict.  
 After an initial attack on February 14, the American Embassy in Tehran was 
taken over by a group of militant fundamentalists as a response to the Shah‟s 
reception by the Unites States and sixty six Americans were captured. The embassy 
takeover was planned to be a short one and its goal was to prove the capability of the 
Iranians to stand against the United States and to encourage the Iranian people on the 
road to the revolution.
138
 Despite the fact that Washington knew that the anti-
Americanism in Iran was expanding, hostage-taking was an unexpected incident 
from the American side. President Carter was at Camp David and he considered the 
crisis as propaganda to be soon resolved as well. Nevertheless, there was no official 
authority to negotiate except from a transitional government in Iran, which was in a 
totally chaotic atmosphere and the usual means of negotiation, persuasion and 
pressure were not usable under the chaotic conditions. The students who took over 
the embassy declared that the hostages were not going to be released unless the 
disposed Shah was returned to Iran.  
 The American response to the hostage-taking was first an attempt to negotiate 
with Khomeini, who was the de facto leader of the militants. Khomeini was not 
officially declared as a leader, however, statements made by Khomeini and his son 
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made clear that he was not opposing the hostage taking, but endorsing it.
139
 Despite 
the personal request of President Carter, Khomeini refused to negotiate, which 
resulted in deportation of the Iranian official representatives in the United States as 
the Revolutionary Council took up the government in Iran.
140
  
 The role of the media in the crisis had been an issue that attracted attention of 
many scholars. The principal newspapers and television channels had a crucial role 
in shaping the Iranian image in the minds of the Americans and in creating heartfelt 
outrage for the hostage-taking. As Scott argued in her study, the captivity narratives 
were useful in shaping and defining the relations between the two countries. The 
myths and symbols utilized by the media tended to represent Iranians as “devilish 
savages” and these kinds of representations not only justified the U.S. foreign policy 
but also formed public opinion and provided unity.
141
 Thus, the criticized president 
also gained support of the people for the time being until they preferred to change the 
leadership with the election of Ronald Reagan.  
 By June 1980, some of the hostages were released but instability in Iran 
continued for domestic reasons. There were clashes between the leftists and Islamic 
fundamentalists and on September 22, 1980, the Iran-Iraq War broke out after the 
invasion of Iran‟s Khuzestan province by Iraq. In the meantime, the health of Shah 
was getting terminal and he had to leave the U.S. and go to Egypt upon the invitation 
of President Anwar Sadat and he rested there until his death on July 27.  
 The hostages were freed on January 20, 1981 due to the fact that the 
Khomeini government decided that they would no longer be of use. The hostage-
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taking reached its goal and humiliated the United States and President Carter, who 
had supported the Shah. The prestige of the United States was damaged and it was 
demonstrated to the world that the United States was not able to protect its citizens. 
Additionally, the U.S. government stated in an agreement that it would not attempt to 
overthrow the revolutionary Iranian government or intercede in internal affairs of 
Iran.
142
  
 As it is stated before, the hostage crisis left its marks on memories of both 
Iranians and the Americans. For the Iranians, the crisis was obviously not the 
beginning of the problem. The fact that their prime minister, Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadegh was overthrown as a result of a coup organized by the intelligence 
services of Britain and the United States had already humiliated the Iranian people. 
The opposition gained voice after the intervention and it expanded during the White 
Revolution that was launched by the Shah and further deteriorated the socio-
economic imbalances of the country. The anti-Shah perspectives united all kinds of 
opposition groups. However, Ayatollah Khomeini, the doyen of the clergy, emerged 
as the leader of the revolution. Khomeini was seen as the leader that would help 
Iranian people make the Shah abdicate the throne, but an Islamic Revolution per se 
was not anticipated by all of these groups. Nevertheless, with the hostage-taking 
operation of Islamist students, the Islamist group gained more power. The lectures of 
Khomeini declaring the Shah and the United States “evil” and “satan” called people 
to revolution. The hostage crisis united both the Iranians and the Americans albeit in 
opposing camps. Iran “proved” to the world that it was capable of defeating the 
United States. The American people defined themselves just as opposed to Iran, 
which was successfully represented as “irresponsible savages” by the media. Thus, 
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the incident was clearly a turning point in the U.S.-Iranian relations due to its effects 
on their identities and foreign policies, which is discussed in Chapter IV. 
 In conclusion, aside the outrage that hostage taking created in the United 
States and elsewhere was a fundamental rule regarding diplomatic immunity. Iran 
had violated that rule and opened the venue to being labeled a rogue state at the end 
of the day. No matter how justified Iran‟s outrage against the regime of its Shah and 
perceived exploitation, dogmatic religious worldviews took over to the exclusion of 
the country from the family of nations.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS ON THE ROAD TO THE ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTION 
 
 
Up until this part, the thesis discussed the foreign policies of the West, 
particularly of the United States, and the external and internal dynamics of Iran since 
the First World War. Acceding to the throne in 1921, Reza Shah developed close 
relations with the West and conducted a stiff modernization program, particularly in 
the military field. During the Second World War, British and Soviet forces occupied 
Iran because, first, although Iran declared neutrality during World War II, neither the 
Soviets nor the British were convinced. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, Iran 
had a railroad that linked the Caspian to the Persian Gulf. This railroad was used to 
deliver aid to the Soviets during the war. As a result of the Anglo-Soviet occupation, 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, son of Reza Shah, came to the throne and continued 
his father‟s modernization program with a more comprehensive scope and in a 
similar rigorous manner. During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, the interest of 
the U.S. in the region and in Iran was at a peak. The U.S. was the primary external 
actor, particularly during the Cold War, when the Islamic Revolution took place 
removing Mohammad Reza Shah from throne and settling a new regime. 
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This part of the thesis will take a look at the relations between the two 
countries, this time with a more theory-informed approach and it will discuss the 
threat-identity dynamics in the U.S-Iranian Relations on the road to the Islamic 
Revolution. It will also examine the constitutive relationship between identity and 
foreign policy through discourse and threat perceptions and security concerns of Iran 
and the United States in line with this relation in a deeper way, using a post-
structuralist approach. First, a review of the literature on the identity-foreign policy 
relationship will be provided and then after a summary of the historical background 
of the U.S.-Iranian relations, the case of U.S.-Iranian relations will be analyzed in 
light of theory. 
 
  4.1. Identity and Foreign Policy: A Constitutive Relationship 
Identity came into the IR literature with a deeper research agenda particularly 
after the Cold War, after which various conflicts that have been regarded as being 
about identity differences broke out.
143
 One of the approaches that take up the 
identity factor within a comprehensive framework is post-structuralism, which 
argues that identities are continuously reproduced through foreign policy discourse 
and practices. Accordingly, it refuses the existence of pre-given identities that are 
independent of foreign policies.
144
 In this context, Hansen clearly puts forward the 
main assumption of post-structuralism as “that representations and policy are 
mutually constitutive and discursively linked”, whereas a causal relationship is the 
only way of knowledge generation for rationalist approaches. Thus, policy and 
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identity are inseparable concepts for post-structuralism.
145
 Moreover, for Hansen, 
foreign policies need a story of the issues they address. That is, for instance, in order 
to have a development policy; a definition of what is developed and underdeveloped 
must be provided. Nevertheless, quoting Campbell, Hansen also emphasizes that 
identities are not solely constructed as opposed to a totally different other.
146
 On the 
contrary there can be different degrees of otherness and when it comes to the foreign 
policy decision makers, according to Hansen, they belong to “a larger political and 
public sphere” and their representations are shaped by a larger group of 
representations.
147
  
Campbell asserts that there are different ways of reading history and that 
there are alternative choices to be made. He sees foreign policy as a “boundary-
producing” practice by which states produce and reproduce themselves and thereby 
continue to exist.
148
 Campbell, in this context, opposes the conventional 
understanding that interstate conflicts derive from pre-given identities and contends 
that it is not the “foreignness” that constitutes threats but the dominant subjective 
interpretations by giving some domestic examples such as feminism and 
homosexuality which are also seen as threats too.
149
 Likewise, he sees describing the 
Other as the only way to construct a nation‟s identity. Thus, the boundaries are not 
sharply drawn by constant or consistent identities.  
Based on the above-mentioned framework, the post-structuralist approach 
attributes a performative role to language. This role is explained by Hansen as unique 
played by the construction of meanings and identities. Accordingly, Hansen 
                                                 
145
 Hansen, 28. 
146
 Hansen, 6. 
147
Hansen, 7. 
148
 D. Campbell, Writing security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 62. 
149
 Campbell, 63. 
 58 
categorizes the role of language in two dimensions, as social and political. Language 
is social because it does not belong to an individual but has a collective value. It is 
also political as it has a role in the production and reproduction of identities and in 
inclusion of some subjectivity into them and exclusion of some others.
150
 For 
Derrida, language is a system through which meanings come into being not because 
of the essence of the thing but as a result of juxtapositions.
151
 In her article, which 
compares different approaches to identity, Doty highlights “discursive practices 
approach” among the other approaches as a better way to analyze foreign policy.152 
This approach, according to the argument of the author, emphasizes the “linguistic 
construction of reality”, that is the productive role of language. According to Doty, 
discursive practices cannot be “traced” in a constant manner as they continuously 
change and that is why the notion of intertextuality, meaning texts‟ referring to other 
texts, is important.  
Discursive epistemology of the approach uses primarily discourse analysis as 
its methodology. Doty defines discourse as “a system of statements in which each 
individual statement makes sense”.153 And Hansen, referring to Fairclough, 
maintains that even though most discourse analysis use written or spoken language, 
language does not have to verbal.
154
 For individuals, body language is a type of non-
verbal language, whereas steps taken by states may also be regarded as non-verbal 
language use.  
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In this section, a discourse analyses will be used and some key speeches and 
declarations of the main actors before the Revolution, during the Revolution and 
afterwards, to analyze how they saw their “Self” and how they saw each “Other”.   
 
 4.2. Historical Background 
When the First World War ended, the position of Iran in the region was an 
unprecedented one, although Iran was not a party to the war. The war brought 
devastation to the country and Iran declared its neutrality soon after the war began.
155
 
British forces had occupied most of Iran, to which it attributed great importance for 
its connection with and dominance in its colonies.
156
 Iran was in the heart of the 
interest of Britain and the other powers as a “battlefield”.157 Nevertheless, it was 
Britain and Russia that particularly wanted to consolidate their respective influence 
in Iran.  
The coup by Reza Khan and Sayyid Zia Tabatabai in 1921 is a turning point 
in Iranian history. During their reign, Reza Khan continued to consolidate his power 
putting himself ahead of the Prime Minister Tabatabai with the support of both 
military and civilian groups. After acceding to the throne, taking the title “Shah”, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi went on conducting strict modernization policies, such as 
separation of religion from politics, creation of a disciplined army and consolidation 
of the national economy.
158
 Nevertheless, the people of Iran were not fully unified 
and at peace during this period of transition. According to Zirinsky, instability in the 
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country was fueled by the presence of foreign forces.
159
 The influence of external 
forces always existed and became only indirect under the rule of Reza Shah.  
When the Second World War broke out, the interest of the United States 
increased in Iran, particularly after the abdication of Reza Shah and of course the 
importance of oil in the region was understood. The new shah, Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi took up the modernization program of his father, even more 
rigorously.
160
  
When the war ended and Britain left its place in the region to the United 
States and the super power rivalry of the Cold War also influenced Iran. The Shah 
considered the United States as a close ally and he welcomed American advisors who 
were sent to help Iran to construct its economy and well-established administration. 
However, the modernization program and the economic and political aid from the 
United States created resentment among the Iranian people, like it did after the First 
World War. Political repression by the Shah‟s regime, censure, prison and torture did 
not help either. Ayatollah Khomeini, who was sent to exile by the Shah, was 
welcomed back with great excitement. The demonstrations against the Shah 
increased both in number and violence. The followers of Khomeini believed that 
being in a clear conflict with the United States was more beneficial to Iran than a 
“friendly and dangerous” relationship.161 The hostage crisis, during which American 
diplomats were captured in Iran, was a way of triggering an open conflict and it 
shortly became the symbol of Iranian independence. In the meantime, Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi had to leave the throne and his country on February 11, 1978 and 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, declared to be the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary 
Council took over control of the country.  
 
4.3. Case: Iran and the United States 
This section will apply the theoretical approach to the case of Iran and the 
United States and through discourse analysis, it will evaluate the discursive practice 
through which they constitute Self and Other and it will answer the question how 
identity production and the threat-identity dynamics affected their relationship on the 
road to the Islamic Revolution.  
As it is explained before, post-structuralist approach attributes a constitutive role to 
language. It should be noted that actors do not always openly and certainly juxtapose 
the Self with the Other. Hence, there may not be an obvious articulation.
162
 Hansen 
gives the construction of Saddam Hussein as evil by President George W. Bush as an 
example. In his speeches, Bush did not explicitly say that he himself was not evil or 
that American people were free as opposed to the “oppressed” people of 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the speeches of President Bush had been almost totally 
accepted by the international community, which helped the U.S. to gain support for 
its policies on the issue. So, it can be concluded that apart from articulation of an 
Other and Self, it is also important for the articulation to be internalized and become 
a part of a larger picture.  
Following Hansen, who holds that it is key moments and change periods that 
more radical Otherness becomes obvious, this research will take into account official 
statements made by the main actors during key times in the relations.
163
 Thus, three 
separate time periods will be provided: The Shah period, the revolutionary period 
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and the Khomeini period. And different from most of the discourse analysis studies, 
it will take a look at both sides of the case, how they separately constructed their 
identities and foreign policies. To this end, The American Presidency Project is used 
as a comprehensive source of official speeches, conferences and statements of the 
U.S. presidents.
164
 The database also covers the statements made by Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi in response to the ones made by the U.S. presidents during their 
mutual visits. In addition, some documentary pieces of the interviews made with the 
Shah are also used.   
But first, a brief look at the Western representations of Middle East, of which 
Iran was an important part, will be provided as it is important in demonstrating the 
constructedness of the images of the region and its implications for the identity 
construction of the West.   
 
4.3.1. Representations of the Middle East  
As it is stated above, from a post-structuralist perspective, identities and 
foreign policies mutually constitute each other in a continuous way. The 
performative role of language is also emphasized by post-structuralist scholars. In a 
similar way, we can also talk about the representations of a part of the world within 
this framework. Highlighting the “constructedness” of the Middle East as a regional 
other, Bilgin discusses the changes in what is understood by “Middle East”.165 
Accordingly, the concept of Middle East, known to be invented by a U.S. officer 
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902, was firstly about being on the road to India. 
With the end of the Second World War and increasing U.S. interest in the region, the 
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concept began to be debated again and oil, instead of trade routes tended to shape the 
Middle East image. Nevertheless, it was British war time definition that was adopted 
in the Cold War period.
166
 In this context, Bilgin also draw attention to the effects of 
this ambiguity on policies, that is, it gives a choice to policy makers to change the 
meaning according to policy purposes.
167
 Hence, it should be noted that like all other 
identities, the name of the region, creating an Other, has also some various 
implications behind and it is not a pre-given concept and all the attributions to the 
region are a product of a process.  
 
4.3.2. Representations during the Shah Era 
When statements made by the U.S. presidents between the years 1969 and 
1979
168
 are examined, it is seen that from Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter (until his 
last presidency years), the discourse shows a continuity. As far as the relations 
between the United States and Iran are concerned, they follow a similar pattern of 
identification of themselves and the other. On the other hand, the discourse of Reza 
Shah also resembles that of the presidents of the United States.  While one of the 
speeches made by Nixon during a visit of the Shah on October, 21 1969 emphasized 
the “pro-American” character of Iran as opposed to a “pro-communist” one, the 
Shah‟s representation of the United States was oriented to the “unselfish and 
generous attitudes” of the U.S. towards Iran and the discourse put forward the 
“problem solving” role of the U.S.169  
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Likewise, particularly during the presidency of Carter, mutual speeches 
during visits the United States defined Iran as a “partner” and “friend” who should 
be proud of progress it made. On the other hand, the discourse of Reza Shah 
emphasized the “same principles and same ideals” shared with the U.S. and again 
defined the United States as “unselfish”. In another visit, additionally, Iran defined 
itself as a “good and trusted friend” of the United States.170 
On the other hand, during interviews made with him by British and American 
journalists, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi did not hesitate to say: “We are not the 
toys of any country including the United States.”171 As part of the same interview, he 
put forward that Iran wanted to be a “model state” and gave more evidence about 
how Iran saw itself. 
Table 1: Representations of Iran and the U.S. during the Shah Era 
Representations of Iran United States 
Other 
-problem solving 
-unselfish and generous 
-sharing the same principles 
and ideals 
-friend 
-pro-American (not pro-
communist) 
-partner 
-friend 
-should be proud of its 
history 
-progressive 
Self 
-independent 
-a model state 
-modern 
-good and trusted friend of 
U.S. 
-aiming at peace and stability 
in the world 
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 On this issue, Table 1, show the various identifications made by the United 
States and Iran about themselves and each other. Likewise, when we take a look at 
the bilateral relations between the United States and Iran during this period, we see 
that the discursive practice summarized above is in a mutually constitutive 
relationship with foreign policy. Recognizing the importance of Iran, the United 
States defined Iran as a close partner, which was marked by frequent visits of Reza 
Shah to the United States. Nevertheless, it is a known fact that despite the mutual 
contentment between the two leaders, the close relationship between the Shah and 
the United States created resentment among the Iranian people and there was a 
duality of representations in the domestic realm, with Khomeini who represented the 
Shah as an enemy of Iran, equally as the U.S. However, when we look at the 
discursive practices of the main actors, there is not any radical difference between 
the representations.  
 
4.3.3. Representations during the Revolutionary Era: The Hostage Crisis 
The hostage crisis constituted a concrete turning point in the relations of 
revolutionary Iran and the United States. The crisis, which lasted from November 4, 
1979, until January 20, 1981 was triggered by sixty-six Americans‟ being taken 
hostage by militant anti-Americans in Iran.
172
 During this period, the United States 
began to refer to its self identity in a different way and it began to draw borders 
making the difference between Self and Other more obvious.  
In this context, Table 2 demonstrates the changing definitions of self-
identities and description of the other party both on the Iranian and American side. 
As of this crisis, the American discourse on Iran also changed. President Carter, 
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calling the Iranians who committed the incident “terrorists”, “militants” and 
“radicals”, reminded of the American “resolution” and “courage” and presented the 
crisis as “a test of the strength of American people and their determination.” Carter 
ended his statement by saying: “We, Americans shall not fail.”173 In the following 
statements, Iranians who held demonstrations in the United States and in Iran were 
accused of being in a highly “emotional state and “irresponsible”174, while Carter 
represented the United States as  “controlled” and “firm”. Moreover, Carter 
explained the situation as being “… [H]eavy burden of world responsibility that our 
blessings and power had brought.”175 Nevertheless, it should be noted that by the 
time this crisis took place there was only a transitional government in Iran to be a 
respondent. However, Khomeini was seen as the responsible party for not attempting 
to solve the crisis.  
Beginning with the crisis, the threat perceptions of the United States and Iran 
also showed a changing pattern parallel with the discourse. Iran, identifying itself as 
anti-American and anti-interventionist, ceased to be an ally of the United States 
against the Soviet threat. On the other hand, the United States defined its self-identity 
against what it thought Iran to be, i.e. radical, terrorist, irresponsible and emotional 
and presented itself as opposed to these identities, which it considered to be threat, as 
the “responsible” one.  
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Table 2: Representations of Iran and the U.S. during the Hostage Crisis 
Representations of Iran United States 
Other -interventionist  
-radical 
-terrorist 
-irresponsible 
-emotional 
Self -anti-interventionist 
-controlled 
-responsible 
-courageous 
-resolved  
 
4.3.4. Representations of the Khomeini Era 
When Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council took over the government in 
Iran on April 1, 1979, the hostage crisis was not over. Despite the fact that militants 
accepted to turn over the hostages to the Government of Iran, Khomeini and the 
Council did not accept to take them.
176
 This attitude immediately caused the United 
States to blame Khomeini of “hiding behind the militants”. In his statement, 
President Carter announced that all Iranian diplomats were declared persona non 
grata, and that the United States broke all diplomatic relations with Iran and that 
economic relations also ceased.  
On the other hand, Ayatollah Khomeini, having returned from exile with 
great popular support, continued his anti-American/anti-West statements as well as 
anti-Shah ones. Khomeini, calling the Shah the “biggest traitor” accused him of 
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cooperating with the West, who was the interventionist and invader in the history of 
Iran.
177
 Often referring to the Qur‟an, Khomeini talked about the popular support he 
received in his speeches and statements. Furthermore, in these declarations, he 
attacked the United States and the West in general and blamed them of rendering 
Iran corrupt and dependent.
178
 In one of his addresses, on November 12, 1979, 
Khomeini clearly asked the Iranian people to call Carter to account for the Shah 
regime and imputed him with committing crimes, pursuing his own personal 
interests.
179
  
Table 3 demonstrates the radically opposing representations of Iran and the 
United States about themselves and each other: 
Table 3: Representations of Iran and the U.S. during the Khomeini Era 
Representations of Iran United States 
Other 
-interventionist  
-self-interested 
-criminal 
- Great Satan 
-radical 
-terrorist 
-irresponsible 
-human rights/law violator 
Self 
-anti-American 
-anti-West 
-independent 
-Muslim 
-controlled 
-responsible 
-courageous 
-resolved  
 
4.4. Evaluation 
Both the United States and Iran reproduced their identities through their 
policy discourses and they constructed radically different Selves after the Islamic 
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Revolution of 1979. Beginning with the Hostage Crisis and the transitory period, 
they alienated each other by attributing threats and differences. During the reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, in spite of the fact that Iran still had security 
concerns as regards its independence, a possible intervention and the Soviet threat, 
and despite the way Iran saw itself, Reza Shah had very close relations with most of 
the U.S. presidents at that time as it can be understood from their declarations and 
statements. Furthermore, the common threat perception of the two countries provided 
the relationship to be based on the “same ideals and principles”. In this respect, a 
possible Soviet intervention constituted a common threat for the U.S. and Iran. 
Talking about the Indian-U.S. relations, Muppidi contends that the United States 
implicitly made the Soviet Union “the Other” while it talked about “shared 
principles”.180 Thus, foreign policy and discursive practice constituted each other and 
the threat-security dynamics of the two sides, which gained different dimensions 
after the Islamic Revolution. The United States, whose discourse did not openly 
emphasize its self-identity, began to draw visible lines between the Other and the 
Self. While it was accusing the militants of being “irrational”, it was producing its 
“controlled” and “rational” characteristic. So, it is worth noting that the overlapping 
threat perception gave place to a different understanding of threat. Revolutionary 
Iran began to identify its security concerns as opposed to the interventionist West. 
On the other hand, the U.S. was exposed to a direct threat with its diplomats‟ being 
taken hostage. 
 In the Khomeini period, when Iran began to identify itself totally against the 
U.S. and construct an anti-American identity, it also identified its security concerns 
and threat perception accordingly. Regarding the U.S. as the primary potential threat, 
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Iran shaped its identity and its relationship with the U.S. parallel with this 
identification.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 The post-structuralist approach regards identities and foreign policies as 
mutually constitutive. Thus, its main assumption is that there are no pre-given and 
constant identities. While emphasizing the interaction between identity and foreign 
policy, it attributes language a performative role, through which things gain identity 
and meaning. 
 This chapter looked at the identity and foreign policy relation from a post-
structuralist perspective. Following a theoretical framework and a brief historical 
background on Iran, it applied discourse analysis to the U.S.-Iranian case so as to 
analyze the relations between the two countries before and just after the revolution 
and it sought to show the identity and foreign policy constructions of the actors and 
their threat-security concerns on the road to the Islamic Revolution.  
 As a result, identity, constituted with foreign policy becomes only possible 
with a description of “foreign” in order to define itself. Both Iran and the United 
States redefined their identity and foreign policy in line with their threat perceptions 
and security policies during three key phases in their relationship. The discourses of 
the U.S. presidents, Shah and Khomeini, clearly demonstrate that although the U.S. 
and Iran previously had overlapping security interests in identifying the Soviets as a 
common threat, after the abdication of the Shah, Iran took a radical step beginning 
with the hostage crisis, and with the loss the common threat perceptions, both sides 
began to present its own identity in juxtaposition to each other. At last, as their 
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discourses suggested, both the U.S. and Iran began to construct their self identities 
and their security concerns radically different during the Khomeini period.  
 In conclusion, the threat-identity dynamics in the U.S.-Iranian relations might 
play a role on the road to the Islamic Revolution and this dynamics is constituted by 
the relationship between foreign policy discourses and declared identities of the two 
countries.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION FROM THE SOCIETAL 
SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
As the previous chapters demonstrated, although Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi had considerably good relations with the United States, the opposition 
groups in Iran played a core role on the road to the Islamic Revolution. Headed by 
the Ayatollah Khomeini and his students through anti-American feelings, this 
perception of threat on the side of the Iranian society united all genres of opposition 
groups against the regime. Thus, Iran, as a state, was an ally of the United States, 
whereas Iranian society had a different perception of the United States. This chapter 
will discuss the developments that led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 from a 
societal security perspective, in order to examine the relation between the state 
security and societal security in Iran before the revolution.  
To this end, first, the theoretical framework will be provided on the concept 
of societal security. Then, the social movements and the perspectives of the social 
groups in Iran and the Iranian society as a whole will be examined in parallel with 
the theoretical framework.  
 73 
5.1. Societal Security 
The terms “society” and social” have been defined many times by 
sociologists. On the definition of the term “society”, German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies introduced the distinction between society and community, in German terms 
between “Gemeinschaft” and “Gesellschaft”. According to this distinction, the 
community is a natural unit that is not consciously articulated, while society is 
constructed on a “contract-like” base.181 Nevertheless, considering society as a 
consequence of a rational contract renders individuals as the basic units. Referring to 
the definitions of Durkheim, Wæver concludes that society is more than the sum of 
its parts and can not be reduced to individuals. At this point, social identity consists 
not only of the common characteristics of a group but also of a feeling of being an 
entity together. Thus, this entity can change in terms of size, intensity of feeling and 
also a sense of being together, ranging from a small group to a nation.  
A second distinction that is made by Wæver is between social groups and 
society. In a society there can be various social groups that have different identities 
and security concerns. For instance, farmers in a society constitute a social group and 
have their own security concerns that do not belong to the whole society. Societies 
differ from social groups in that they show continuity through generations and have 
an infrastructure of norms, values and institutions. Security of social groups has 
importance in that their insecurity can easily grow and expand to the whole society.  
A third point that should be noted is the distinction between societal security 
and state security. In spite of the fact that states are established by societies, the 
security of a society can not be linked to state security. In fact, Immanuel Wallerstein 
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describes society as “the other” of the state.182  In this respect, society is not only the 
final source of legitimacy for the state but also an alternative place.  
Buzan, in his book entitled People, States and Fear, categorizes the sectors of 
state security into five as political, economic, environmental, societal and military 
sectors. Accordingly, the societal sector makes of a part of the state security, rather 
than presenting an alternative referent for security. Nevertheless, Jones argues that in 
order to rethink security in the post-Cold War era, a study on security should go 
beyond the traditional approach that takes state as the center of focus.
183
 Likewise, 
Bilgin also points out the fact that the concept of security has traditionally been state-
centered since the seventeenth century, when the state system began to emerge and 
argues that this approach began changing particularly after the Cold War and 
insecurities of non-state actors have taken their places in the studies of various 
scholars, in which questions of referent, concepts of human and societal security and 
agents of security are discussed.
184
  
Accepting that methodological individualism is not an appropriate starting 
point to study collective identity and security, McSweeney criticizes Buzan and 
Wæver because of ignoring “individual consciousness” and rejecting subjectivism.185 
According to McSweeney, collectivism does not exist independently from the 
individuals who comprise it. Thus, he emphasizes the need for deconstructing 
collective concepts and argues that exposing human units does not prevent 
collectivities from being taken as actors. In their response to the criticism of 
McSweeney, Buzan and Wæver assert that the security of societies could be seen as 
                                                 
182
 Wæver, 19. 
183
 R. W. Jones, “Travel Without Maps: Thinking about Security after the Cold War”, in M.J. Davis, 
ed., Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996), 197. 
184
 P. Bilgin, “Individual and Societal dimensions of Security”, International Studies Review, 5:2, 
(2003), 203-222. 
185
 B. McSweeney, “Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Wæver”, 
Review of International Studies, 24, (1998), 137-140. 
 75 
the referent object and that there are existential threats both for state and society. For 
states, sovereignty defines the existential threat, whereas for society the loss of 
identity is the existential threat. If a state loses its sovereignty, it is no longer a state, 
and in a society identity is the core of existential threats because it defines whether 
“we” are still us.186 
Buzan, discussing the threats to societal security, emphasizes that societal 
identities are not static and not all kinds of changes are seen as threats. Moreover, in 
line with their identities, societies may decide what is a threat inside themselves, and 
they each show different characteristics of openness to change. Some societies are 
more conservative in terms of accepting change, whereas some of them are more 
liberal.
187
 According to Buzan, a societal identity may be threatened in various ways. 
Forbidding the use of language, names and dress, closure of places of education or 
worship may pose threats to societal identity. Furthermore, it should be noted that a 
threat may not always damage identities; sometimes it strengthens them through 
reinforcement. For example, Palestinian and Jewish identities were intensified in line 
with the threats they encounter.
188
  
In addition to the changes in identity, another source of threat to societal 
identities is competitive identities. In this respect, identities may be mutually 
exclusive, e.g. Muslim and Christian, or may have a hierarchical relationship, e.g. 
Canadian and Quebecois. Likewise, in other levels of intensity, the interaction of 
ideas can produce politically significant societal and cultural threats.
189
 For instance, 
Islamic fundamentalists are sensitive to the expansion of Western ideas and 
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practices, whereas Europeans are generally sensitive about Muslim migrants. In this 
context, economic and technological developments may also be seen as threats as 
they can undermine one identity and enforce a competing one, one example of which 
is Third World‟s complaints about Westernization.190  
Hence, it may also be possible that state security and societal security clash 
because governments are not always representative of societies and they may even 
threaten societies. In a sense, it is possible that state security may dominate societal 
security and find its security in the insecurity of the other. 
 
 5.2. Iran and Societal Security 
In this section, two aspects of the societal security during the pre-revolution 
era in Iran will be discussed. First, the relations between the United States and Iran 
will be examined from the perspective of Iranian society. Second, the repressive rule 
of the Shah, beginning from the first years of his rule and reaching its peak with the 
White Revolution will be addressed. It will be argued that the two dimensions of 
Iranian politics may have caused a societal insecurity perceived by the Iranian 
society at that time, which eventually led to the social unrests paving the path to the 
Islamic Revolution. 
The reasons of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 have been explained by 
scholars in various ways. Some emphasized the disequilibrium between the political 
developments and the socio-economic situation, while some others gave more 
importance to the ideological and cultural dimension of the unrest.
191
 For the 
purposes of this section, both approaches will be discussed to explain the societal 
insecurity of the Iranians.  
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The Islamic Revolution in Iran doubtlessly had its roots back in the history 
beginning from the First World War, during and after which Iran became the focus of 
interest of foreign powers, particularly Britain and Russia. The Anglo-Russian 
invasion during the Second World War constituted a trauma in Iran, both politically 
and socially. Its oil resources were managed by the AIOC, which served the British; 
and its domestic politics and foreign relations were shaped by the fact of invasion.  
As Cottam so aptly put it, Iran was not independent due to its inhabitants; it was its 
geography where British and Russian interests met.
192
  
 Before World War I, the West had recognized the importance of the raw 
materials coming from the Middle East. Thus, the Middle Eastern countries, 
including Iran, became exporter of various materials, and they were also influenced 
in political and economical terms through interaction with the West. In the domestic 
realm, Iran had a weak government and dynasty. The Qajar dynasty was not able to 
impose power on tribes effectively. Corruption in the bureaucracy was high. The 
army was considerably disorganized, except for the Cossack Brigade, the duty of 
which was to protect the shah and his court.
193
 Under these conditions, the ulama 
were an effective group and they were extracting religious taxes and duties. Schools, 
hospitals and law courts were the responsibility of the ulama. 
 Another factor that influenced the fragile atmosphere was the external forces. 
Since the Napoleonic Wars, Britain and Russia had strong political and economic 
interests in Iran. Britain was concerned to maintain control of the Persian Gulf, 
whereas Russia wanted to make north of Iran an area of influence, which caused a 
rivalry between Russia and Britain as neither of them wanted to allow the other to 
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consolidate its power.
194
 In 1909, after oil was found in Iran, the Anglo-Persian 
Company (later named Anglo-Iranian Company) took control of the Iranian oil 
reserves and it was fully at the hands of the British. The AIOC was managed by the 
British officials and it paid little tax to the Iranian state. In the face of such a 
concession given to Britain, Russia also demanded concessions to be equal with the 
British and it obtained some economic privileges as well.  Hence, Iran under the 
Qajar dynasty had limited independence.  
 The heavy influence exerted by the Russians and the British brought 
economic and political dislocations. As a result of the unrest due to the concessions 
given to foreign countries, a revolutionary movement was on the rise. In 1905, the 
constitutional revolution succeeded and in 1906 the first majlis was opened and it 
was subdued by bombing in 1908 by the Cossack Brigade.
195
 At the roots of the 
constitutional revolution was also the popular discontent derived from excessive 
foreign intervention, which continued to exist after the revolution until a total 
breakdown of the relations with the West in 1979.  
As it was stated in the previous chapters, the First World War aggravated the 
situation in Iran. External intervention continued to augment. Britain and Russia 
divided Iran into spheres of influence and Iranian people were not content with the 
governments that allowed external powers to increase their influence in Iran. In 
1921, the dissatisfaction of some civilians and some soldiers turned into a coup. Reza 
Khan and Sayyed Zia took control of the country as a result of a coup in 1921 and 
formed a new government that tried to preserve Iranian independence. Nevertheless, 
foreign intervention continued to exist, in other forms. In the interwar period, Iran 
began receiving aid from the United States in terms of advisors who assisted Tehran 
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to establish its infrastructure. Secondly, during the Second World War, Iran was 
occupied once again by the Anglo-Russian forces in 1941, which ended with the 
intervention of a third external power: the United States. Furthermore, the invasion 
had changed the Shah, acceding Mohammad Reza Shah to the throne.  
The new Shah had close relations with the United States, making it a 
counterbalance against Britain and Russia and under his rule, Iran became one of the 
largest aid-receiving countries in the Middle East. Thus, the Shah was highly 
criticized of being pro-American and being a client of the United States. Particularly 
after the coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh organized by the CIA 
and the MI6, reactions to the regime and the Shah became more obvious. With the 
coup, the nationalization of Iranian oil reserves, which was considerably supported 
by the Iranian people, was interrupted. As the most direct foreign intervention, the 
coup attracted reactions from the Iranian society, which demonstrated the resentment 
felt by the people.  
The fact that the Shah was supported by the United States was the primary 
focus of critics coming from the Khomeini‟s opposition. Khomeini believed that the 
Shah remained in power due to the American support and aid.
196
 Various opposition 
groups united around this idea under the leadership Khomeini, although they did not 
all want an Islamic regime. 
When the domestic situation in Iran and its foreign relations are examined, it 
is worth noting that external intervention was perceived as a threat to the Iranian 
identity within the Iranian society. Despite the fact that the foreign policy of the Shah 
was shaped to protect the interests and security of the Iranian state, the insecurities of 
the Iranian people were somehow different from what the Shah perceived. 
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Counterbalancing policy was not seen to be different from Anglo-Russian invasion 
and close relations with the United States created resentment among the people 
against the Shah, who had come to the throne as a result of a coup during this 
invasion. From this perspective, the Western, first Anglo-Russian and then American 
influence was not only a direct threat to the independence of Iran and its people but 
also had a negative impact on the Iranian culture and identity.  
The second aspect of the societal insecurity of the Iranian people derived 
from the domestic policies of Mohammad Reza Shah, again in relation to foreign 
relations at that time. In effect the socio-economic and political imbalances in Iran 
were not new to the Shah‟s era. Since the Qajar dynasty, inequalities among the 
classes and social groups had disturbed the disadvantaged people. The weak, 
inefficient and corrupt Qajar dynasty granted concessions, monopolies to foreign 
powers, it failed in the military field and also it failed to preserve commerce and 
industry.
197
 
After Reza Shah started the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran managed to launch a rapid 
capital accumulation and industrialization. A national bank was established and 
foundations of an infrastructure that Iran lacked were laid. Nevertheless, it benefitted 
only the upper class of the society and the working class paid heavy costs. The 
capital of the national bank came from the taxes of the poor and the system served 
large landowners and the rich. Smaller bazaaris, artisans and working-class were not 
able to benefit from reasonable credit rates. In addition, peasants were generally 
ignored in these steps.
198
 The economic policies were in favor of industrial owners, 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie and big merchants and the gap between the groups were 
deepening.  
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Furthermore, the policies of Reza Shah also reduced the political power of the 
clergy, which caused disturbance and led to opposition. The fact that women were 
given more rights particularly created complaint among the clergy and they always 
made use of their opposition to the rights given to women while propagating against 
the Shah and his son.  
Taking up the throne, Mohammad Reza Shah assumed his father‟s policies, 
even more rigorously. The Second World War had affected Iranian economy 
negatively and American advisors sent to Iran had to resign due to the opposition. 
Military expenditures were growing larger and scarcity was beginning to appear.
199
 
As it was the case during the reign of Reza Shah, it was the urban middle-class 
people who gained from the policies of the Shah. Peasants were highly affected by 
scarcity and famine; tribes were also on the side of those who suffered from the 
economic inequalities. Despite the fact that these economic disruptions paved the 
way to the politicization of social groups, peasants and tribes were the last two that 
asked for their rights. Among the urban groups, people began to develop awareness. 
The White Revolution of 1963 that was initiated by the Shah so as to gather 
power in his hands after the overthrow of Mossadegh deepened the socio-economic 
problems from which some groups in the Iranian society suffered, despite the 
improvements in some sectors such as health, education and agriculture. Using the 
increasing oil revenues, education rates were improved tenfold, considerable growth 
in industrialization was achieved, the number of hospitals augmented. Moreover, the 
Revolution brought radical land reforms in the rural areas. Although some 
achievements were obtained, the Revolution failed to gain popular support. 
Abrahamian puts the reasons for this failure as the overthrow of Mossadegh whom 
                                                 
199
 Keddie, 116. 
 82 
the middle class had particularly supported and policies being more beneficial to the 
upper class, but not to the middle and lower classes.
200
 The middle class was 
important in that its members were bazaaris who controlled the trade, besides artisans 
and intelligentsia who wanted more political rights. Especially after the 
establishment of SAVAK, people were politically repressed and opposition was not 
tolerated. The attempt to control the bazaar failed. Considering that the bazaaris had 
family relations with the clergy through inter-marriage, they formed a formidable 
block of opposition. The intended changes highly damaged the interests of bazaaris. 
Bazaaris were among the principal actors of the constitutional movement of 1905 
and they played an important role during the nationalization of oil in the 1950s. From 
1977 to 1979, they were at the core of the opposition movements against the Shah.
201
  
Thus, this group had a great capability of mobilization and collective action.  
Similarly, the interests of the clergy were also disrupted through the land 
reforms and political changes. Many religious institutions had enjoyed relative 
prosperity until the White Revolution.
202
 In some areas, the clergy were large 
landholders and land reforms prevented them to benefit from the taxes they collected. 
Furthermore, one of the Shah‟s decisions especially disturbed the clergy. This 
decision was to give voting rights to women. Although most of the clerical groups 
were not active in opposition, some groups took the opposite position against the 
Shah. Accordingly, Ayatollah Khomeini and his students protested the Shah‟s 
policies and denounced them as contrary to the interests of the Iranian nation.
203
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Hence, the policies of the Shah that required rigorous reforms in the areas of 
economics, agriculture and politics created disturbance among some groups of the 
Iranian society as well as among the whole society. The middle and lower classes 
were discontented about the economic reforms as it was only the upper class that 
benefitted from the financial renovations. As an effective group, bazaaris were forced 
to support the regime and some parts of their businesses were damaged through new 
regulations. The changes were seen as threats to their way of life by bazaaris. 
Furthermore, the repressive political life prevented the middle class to participate in 
politics, which also caused insecurity concerns within this group.  
The clergy had been in an oppositional position since the first interaction with 
the West. As it is stated before, trade between the West and Iran brought changes to 
the way of life in Iran. The products of the industrialized West were not welcomed 
by the Islamists because they perceived these changes as threats to the Iranian 
identity and to their religion as well. Thus, the modernization program of Reza Shah 
and Mohammad Reza Shah made them frustrated with the regime. The regulations 
conducted in the field of religion, e.g. the fact that women were prohibited to cover 
their heads, closure of some mosques, were direct threats to the clergy. The White 
Revolution, which brought more fundamental changes in Iranian political, economic 
and social life constituted the final straw.  
In conclusion, if the society is defined as “the other” of the state, their 
perceptions of threat and insecurity may sometimes clash and they may even threaten 
each other‟s security. One of the duties of the state is to protect the society. However, 
in doing so, the state may limit the security of the society as well. At such times, the 
level of societal insecurity increases and it may lead to open conflict between society 
and state, as it is the case for some revolutions. This part of the thesis linked the 
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social movements and oppositions leading to the Islamic Revolution to the theories 
of societal security and it took a look at the societal insecurities of the Iranian people 
as opposed to state policies. 
The societal insecurities of Iran took their roots from past experiences. The 
weakness of the Qajar dynasty and the devastation brought by the First World War 
had already created inequalities among the social groups. The Anglo-Russian 
occupation of the country under the Pahlavi dynasty caused the reactions and 
disturbances to augment. The direct intervention of these foreign powers created 
resentment among the people and it induced the feeling that the state was not capable 
of protecting the society. This view was consolidated when the intelligence services 
of two Western powers, the CIA and the MI6 organized a coup to overthrow Prime 
Minister Mossadegh in cooperation with the Shah. In addition, the social, economic 
and political changes due to the reform programs did not satisfy all social groups. 
The middle and lower classes of the society were not secure as their interests were 
not taken into consideration by the state and furthermore they were suffering from 
the consequences of the reform policies let alone benefitting from them.  
Thus, Ayatollah Khomeini, who headed the Islamic Revolution, managed to 
gather people together around these insecurities. Among the groups that supported 
Khomeini were the leftists, nationalists, the intelligentsia, women, working class and 
lastly peasants. In spite of the fact that they were not aiming at an Islamic 
Revolution, they were united, though some of them joined in the later phases of the 
revolution, as opposed to the regime and under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who promised to provide security for the Iranian society. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis pointed out the interaction between foreign policies of Iran and the 
United States and the internal dynamics of Iran on the path leading to the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. First, the Cold War dynamics was explained so as to form the 
basis for creating an understanding about the foreign policy of the United States and 
the particular position in which Iran found itself after the First World War. Then, in 
this context, the evolution of the U.S.-Iranian relations was discussed from World 
War I to the Cold War period. Besides, identity-security dynamics in this relation, 
the constitutive relationship between identity construction of the two countries and 
the implications of these dynamics on Iran‟s and the U.S. foreign policy was 
examined. Lastly, the pre-revolution period in Iran was narrated from the perspective 
of societal security approach. In this framework, it was argued that the resentments 
of the Iranian society caused an imbalance between state‟s perceptions and those of 
the society. 
 Iran had been the focus of great power interests since the beginning of the 
20th century. Britain was willing to control Iran because it did not want any other 
power to interrupt its contact with the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, Iran 
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was important for Russia as it was situated on a strategic position for its great power 
policies and its plan to access the Persian Gulf. After 1909, the oil reserves in Iran 
added another dimension to the great power rivalry. The first concessions given to a 
British company and establishment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company aggravated 
the Russian demands as well.  
 The First World War made Iran actively get involved in the competition 
between the external powers. Qajar dynasty, which was too weak to control the 
country, was ended by a coup made by Reza Khan and Sayyed Zia Tabatabai in 
1921. In 1926, having consolidated power, Reza Khan became the new shah of Iran 
and appointed Tabatabai as prime minister. The domestic and foreign policies of the 
Shah achieved many developments in the economic and social situation of the 
country. Nevertheless, the rigorous development policies, particularly attempts at 
secularization created opposition as well. Moreover, willing to counterbalance 
Anglo-Russian influence, the Shah preferred to get close with Germany in the 
interwar period, which was not appreciated by the Allies. After invasion of the 
country by Britain and the Soviet Union, Reza Shah was overthrown by a coup.  
 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi followed in his father‟s footsteps and 
continued his father‟s balancing foreign policy. Yet, he chose a rapprochement with 
the United States and he encouraged the United States to get involved more in 
Iranian affairs. The advisory missions were sent from the U.S., military and 
economic aid was granted to Iran during that period and the United States decided 
that oil reserves of Iran were too important to be left to the other powers. 
Furthermore, Iran was on the Soviet border and it was important for Washington to 
keep Iran on its side against Soviet expansionism. During this period, the Shah and 
presidents of the United States, from Eisenhower to Carter always emphasized the 
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common and shared principals of the two countries. In this respect, both the U.S. and 
Iran defined their identities similarly and together, but not against each other.  
 In 1953, the coup overthrowing Prime Minister Mossadegh, who nationalized 
the oil reserves of Iran, attracted great reaction from the Iranians, most of whom 
supported the Prime Minister. The coup, organized by the CIA and the MI6, 
constituted a turning point both in U.S.-Iranian relations and in the domestic 
dynamics of Iran. First, the Shah launched his “White Revolution” reforms so as to 
improve the social, political and economic conditions of his country and increase its 
independence. Nonetheless, the revolution was set up through the help of the United 
States and with the Eisenhower and Nixon Doctrines; Iran was still an important 
receiver of the U.S. military and economic aid.  
   All these turning points where the external forces intervened in Iran, i.e. 
British control over the oil fields, Anglo-Russian invasion, overthrow of Reza Shah 
and Dr. Mossadegh, the excessive aid coming from the United States, the authorities 
given to the American advisory missions, created resentment among the Iranians. 
Furthermore, within the White Revolution radical economic and social reforms were 
conducted by the Shah and these reforms challenged the interests of some social 
groups, i.e. clergy and landowners. But they were not beneficial to the middle and 
lower classes. The strikes, demonstrations and riots were suppressed violently by 
SAVAK, which only caused dissatisfaction with the regime to grow. The various 
opposition groups, i.e. leftists, national front, and the clergy, supported Ayatollah 
Khomeini to overthrow the Shah. Khomeini demanded an Islamic revolution, yet the 
supporting groups just wanted the Shah to go and they believed that they could out- 
maneuver the ayatollah. However, when the opposition grew and the Shah had to 
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leave Iran, Khomeini returned to Tehran, his students had already taken control of 
the country.  
 The discourses that defined the identities of Iran and the United States 
changed particularly after the hostage crisis. When sixty six American diplomats 
were taken hostage, the U.S. accused the Iranians of being “irresponsible” and 
Khomeini and his students represented Washington as “evil” and “interventionist”. 
After the revolution, the representations of the Self and the Other of the two 
countries became even more radically different. 
 In conclusion, when the changes in discourses of Iran and the United States 
and the flow of the relations between them is examined, one can make an implication 
that there was a discrepancy between the Shah‟s construction of the identity of 
Iranian state and the identity construction of the state. In this context, it can be 
argued that the threat perceptions of the Iranian state and society did not overlap, 
which led to strong opposition of the regime.  
 The construction of “Self” and “Other” in the Iranian identity and foreign 
policy constituted a key role in the historical course of U.S.-Iranian relations and in 
domestic dynamics of Iran as well. Beginning from the hostage crisis, which created 
a trauma in the U.S.-Iranian relations, Iran started to define itself radically different 
from the U.S. On the side of the United States, self-identity construction was equally 
important within the conditions of the Cold War in terms of shaping its foreign 
policy in the region and also in the whole world. A possible future research agenda 
may touch upon the importance of the construction of “Self” and “Other” for the 
United States and also upon the duality of representations inside Iran during the Shah 
era, when Khomeini represented the Shah as opposed to Iranian identity. 
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